The Supreme Court of Tennessee has released its opinion in Collier ex rel. Chase C. v. Roussis, E2022-00636-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. July 31, 2026). The syllabus from the slip opinion reads:
In this appeal, we address the analytical framework for determining whether a jury’s exposure to extraneous information during deliberations in a civil case warrants a new trial. The parties in this healthcare liability action tried a complex, multi-day trial in which a central issue was whether it was appropriate for medical personnel not to use epinephrine to treat a pregnant patient’s anaphylactic reaction. The trial included extensive expert testimony about the risks, benefits, and usage of epinephrine during pregnancy. The jury returned a verdict for the Defendants. Thereafter, the Plaintiff learned that one night during jury deliberations, a juror at home examined the warning label on an EpiPen, an epinephrine auto-injector device, and shared that information with the jury during continued deliberations. The Plaintiff moved for a new trial based in part on a claim that the jury’s exposure to the EpiPen information “tainted the verdict.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Plaintiff had not established by clear and convincing evidence that exposure to the EpiPen information affected the jury. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard. We granted permission to appeal to decide the proper analysis when a party in a civil case implicating the constitutional right to a jury trial challenges a verdict because the jury allegedly was exposed to extraneous information. Considering our analogous precedent from criminal cases, we hold that our courts should use a burden-shifting framework to determine whether error occurred and a new trial is required. More specifically, the party challenging the verdict bears the initial burden of proving error—that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information—by a preponderance of the evidence. Upon a successful showing, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises. This circumstance places a burden on the party defending the verdict to rebut the presumption of prejudice by showing that exposure to the material extraneous information was harmless error. To make this showing, the party must demonstrate that there is no reasonable possibility that the information would have altered the verdict of a reasonable jury. Absent this showing, a new trial is warranted due to the violation of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Because the trial court did not have the benefit of this framework when deciding the motion for a new trial, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Here is a link to that opinion: <https://tinyurl.com/54vwk7jj>.
NOTE: This is a must-read opinion for every lawyer who tries cases to a jury in our state's nisi prius courts because of our High Court's instruction as to how the lower courts are to deal with the introduction of extraneous information before a jury.
