New Opinion: Trial Court's Remittitur of Jury Verdict Upheld on Appeal

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Grand Division, issued its opinion in West v. Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC, No. E2016-01860-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2017). Here is a link to the syllabus from the slip opinion:  

This appeal concerns a jury award of damages in a negligence case. Suzanne Bishop West (“West”) sued Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC (“Epiphany”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) for damages resulting from a facial she received that burned her face. Epiphany conceded liability and the matter went before a jury for a determination of damages. The jury awarded West $125,000 in damages. Epiphany filed a motion for remittitur. The Trial Court, finding the award excessive, reduced the award from $125,000 to $47,800. West appeals to this Court, asking that we restore the original jury award of $125,000. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/west_v._epiphany_salon.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Defense Verdict Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued its opinion in Popick v. Vanderbilt University Hospital, No. M2015-01271-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

The plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant hospital after the death of her husband, alleging that his death was the result of negligent medical treatment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court committed reversible error in: (1) excluding certain email messages as hearsay; (2) overruling her objections to defense counsel‟s crossexamination of a witness; (3) failing to instruct the jury to ignore statements made by defense counsel in closing argument; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction; and (5) declining to change the special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/popick.elizabeth.opn_.pdf

New Opinion: Dismissal of Plaintiff's Case Overturned on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Cordell v. Cleveland Tennessee Hospital, LLC, No. M2016-01466-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

The trial court, pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit because she did not comply with certain aspects of the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act incident to the filing of her original complaint. Because we do not construe the allegations in the original complaint as presenting any health care liability claims, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this lawsuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cordell.opn_.pdf

  

New Opinion on Protective Orders and Their Modification

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Autin v. Goetz, No. W2016-00099-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017).  It is a good read on protective orders and their modification.   Here is the syllabus form the slip opinion:

The trial court entered a protective order under Rule 26.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure while the case was ongoing. After the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order confirming the dismissal and extending the protective order "in perpetuity."  The defendant did not appeal the final order, but years later filed a motion to modify the protective order. The trial court denied the motion as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend the protective order after plaintiffs nonsuited their case. As an issue of first impression, we conclude that the trial court retained jurisdiction to extend and modify its previously entered protective order notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the underlying action. We further hold that modification of existing protective orders is authorized by the holding in Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tenn. 1996); accordingly, we vacate the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to modify and remand for reconsideration in light of our supreme court's established precedent.

(Bolding in original.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/autindopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Jury Verdict for Defense Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Bogner v. Vanderbilt University, No. M2015-00669-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).  he syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a health care liability action. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant hospital for medical malpractice, medical battery, and lack of informed consent. The trial court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of the defendant after the plaintiff presented evidence. At the close of all the proof, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the remaining issues of medical battery and informed consent. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict, in refusing to adopt the plaintiff's special jury instructions, and in using a confusing special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/bogner.james_.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Action Upheld on Appeal Due to Ineffective HIPAA Authorization

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Rush v. Jackson Surgical Assocs., P.A., W2016-01289-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a healthcare liability action. After sustaining injuries as a result of alleged surgical error, Appellant filed this action against the surgeon and his medical group. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rushgeraldopn.pdf

NOTE: The syllabus is short and sweet and you have to read the opinion to get an idea of why the case was dismissed.  However, I direct you to my blog post of Nov. 19, 2016, which supports my belief that defendants in a health care liability action do not need a HIPAA-compliant authorization to review a patient's PHI/medical records, and, as result, cannot be "prejudiced" by not getting such an authorization as part of a claimant's presuit notice, to wit: 

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2016/11/new-health-care-liability-action.html

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Decision Finding That Presuit Notice Was Effective and Grant of Leave to Amend Complaint Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Runions v. Jackson-Madison County Hospital District, No. W2016-00901-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this health care liability action, we must determine whether the plaintiff properly complied with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The original defendants in this matter all filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment alleging that they did not provide medical treatment to the plaintiff/appellee. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion acknowledging that she had mistakenly identified a proper defendant in this suit. The plaintiff also filed a motion to amend her complaint attempting to remedy that mistake by substituting in the proper defendant. After both motions were heard, the trial court denied the original defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff/appellee's motion to amend her complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Here is a link to the opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/runionstopn.pdf

Judge Gibson issued a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which can be found at this link: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/runionstiffinnedis.pdf

NOTE: This case was reversed on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court on Jun. 6, 2018.  That opinion can be found at this link, to wit:

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2018/06/new-tennessee-supreme-court-health-care.html

New Wrongful Death Opinion: Surviving Spouse's Prosecution of Claim Disallowed on Appeal; Decedent's Daughter Allowed to Prosecute Claim Instead

The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, just released its opinion in Nelson v. Myres, No. M2015-01857-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017). The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

A woman died in a multi-vehicle accident. Two wrongful death actions were filed, one by the woman's daughter, the other by the woman's husband. The daughter's suit named the husband and others as defendants. The husband's suit named one of the other drivers as the only defendant. The trial court dismissed the daughter's complaint, holding that Tennessee's wrongful death statute creates only one cause of action and that the husband, as the surviving spouse, was granted priority to prosecute the action under the statute. The daughter appeals the dismissal of her complaint. Because the husband is unable to name himself as a defendant in the suit he has filed, he is not able to prosecute the wrongful death action in a manner consistent with the right of the decedent to sue all wrongdoers whose actions are alleged to have led to her death; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the daughter's complaint, reinstate the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings.

(Emphasis added.)

 Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/nelson.brittany.opn_.pdf

NOTE: This is a must-read opinion for any Tennessee practitioner who handles wrongful death claims.  

New Laws Effective in Tennessee on Jan. 1, 2017

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/effective%2001-01-2017.pdf

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion: Seller of Automated External Defibrillator Granted Summary Judgment on Appeal

The Tennessee Supreme Court just issued its opinion in Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, No. E2015-01827-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff‟s husband collapsed and died after participating in a cycling class at a fitness and recreation facility owned and operated by the church. Although the cycling class instructor and others present at the fitness facility attended the plaintiff's husband and called 911 soon after his collapse, they did not utilize the automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on site at the facility. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the church, alleging, among other things, that the church had negligently failed to utilize the onsite AED, to train facility personnel on the proper use of the AED, and to comply with applicable state statutes. The church denied negligence and subsequently filed a third-party complaint against the company that sold it the AED, asserting that the seller had contractually agreed to provide a physician oversight program, which, among other things, included oversight of the church's compliance with federal, state, and local regulations. The church alleged that, should the plaintiff recover a judgment against it for failing to comply with statutes, the seller should be solely responsible for the judgment. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint naming the seller as a defendant and alleging, as relevant to this interlocutory appeal, that: (1) the seller had negligently breached a duty it owed to her husband and others using the fitness facility to properly maintain the AEDs, to ensure that they were accessible, and to ensure that the church's employees had the knowledge, training, and ability to operate the AEDs; (2) the seller had breached its contract with the church; (3) her husband was a third-party beneficiary of the contract; and (4) the seller's negligence and breaches of contract caused her husband's death, entitling her to recover against the seller on her wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.

The seller moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff and the church, arguing that: (1) it owed no duty of care to the plaintiff or her husband; (2) the church had no common law or statutory duty to acquire or use an AED; (3) neither the plaintiff nor her husband were third-party beneficiaries of the seller's contract with the church; (4) the undisputed facts established that the seller had not breached its contract with the church; and (5) the undisputed facts failed to establish that any of the alleged breaches of contract caused the plaintiff‟s husband's death. The trial court denied the seller's motion for summary judgment, concluding that disputes of material fact remained, but it granted the seller permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the seller's application for an interlocutory appeal, but this Court granted the seller permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We conclude that the seller did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff's husband or other users of the fitness facility independent of its contract with the church and that the church had no statutory or common law duty to acquire or use the AED it purchased from the seller, and as a result, the plaintiff's husband was not a third-party beneficiary of the church's contract with the seller. For these reasons, the seller is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's second amended complaint and the church's third-party complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the seller on all claims and for any other necessary and appropriate proceedings consistent with this decision.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/wallissopn.pdf.

NOTE: In addition to the discussion on the law surrounding the seller of an AED's liability in Tennessee, this opinion sheds further light on the post-Rye summary judgment standard in our state, which makes it a must-read for that fact alone.

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Exclusion of Plaintiff's Treating Physician as a Causation Expert and Resulting Grant of Summary Judgment to the Defense Reveresed on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Holmes v. Christ Community Health Services, Inc., No. W2016-00207-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff filed this action alleging medical malpractice against a physician who examined the plaintiff five days after injury to her shoulder, as well as the facility wherein the physician practiced. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a fracture dislocation in her shoulder, causing a delay in appropriate treatment. The plaintiff‘s subsequent treating physician opined in his deposition and via affidavit that if the plaintiff‘s injury had been diagnosed earlier, the plaintiff would likely have avoided an extensive surgical procedure, resultant infection stemming from such surgery, and residual impairment to her shoulder. The trial court excluded this testimony as speculative, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician and hospital. The plaintiff has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in excluding the causation evidence as speculative. We therefore vacate the court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/holmesdopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal Based upon Claim Being Time-barred for Failure to Comply with Onerous Presuit Notice Requirements Upheld on Appeal; Constitutional Challenge of Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121 Deemed to Be Without Merit

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in J.A.C. ex rel. Lesha Carter v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, No. W2016-00024-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2016).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability action, Defendants moved to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs' failure to provide the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") medical authorization required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Based on its determination that the Plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with the foregoing statute, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations and repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) and accordingly concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the viability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 were without merit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/carterleshaopn.pdf

NOTE: I find it interesting that the courts in Tennessee---and many lawyers---have not picked up on the fact that a defendant (or potential defendant) in a health care liability action does not have to have a HIPAA-compliant authorization to share a patient's or plaintiff's protected health information ("PHI") with other defendants and their legal counsel under 45 C.F.R. sections 164.501, -502(b), -.514(d) to investigate potential medical negligence.  See http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/705/may-a-covered-entity-in-a-legal-proceeding-use-protected-health-information/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).  As such, dismissal of a health care liability action because a defendant did not get a HIPAA-compliant authorization for a patient's PHI would be improper because Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121's requirement that such an authorization be enclosed as part of a claimant's presuit notice appears to be preempted by HIPAA. 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Common-knowledge Exception Applies to the Breach of Duty But Not to Causation; Trial Court's Dimissal with Prejudice Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Redick v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2016-00428-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:  

Vicki J. Redick (“Plaintiff”) appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her health care liability action against Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“the Hospital”) and Jane Doe, an employee of the Hospital. We find and hold that Plaintiff, despite application of the common knowledge exception when appropriate, would be unable to prove her claim without expert proof, and therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a certificate of good faith in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. As Plaintiff failed to file the required certificate of good faith, we find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing Plaintiff‟s case with prejudice for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/redickv.j.opn_.pdf

NOTE: In this opinion, the court held that while the common-knowledge exception applied to the breach of duty, Redick v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2016-00428-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at  8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), it did not apply to causation, inter alia, because what injuries the plaintiff suffered were not within the common knowledge of laypersons (unlike when a wrong body part is operated on or a foreign object is unintentionally left in a patient's body after surgery), id. 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Refiled Case Overturned on Appeal Due to the Saving Statute

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Robinson v. Robbins, No. W2016-00381-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1996).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a health care liability action.  The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendant concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the saving statute did not apply because there was no identity of parties between the actions. He explained that the second complaint was filed against him in his individual capacity while the initial complaint was lodged against him in his corporate capacity. The court agreed and held that the second action was barred for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse.

 (Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/robinsonmyrtleopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Another Opinion Acknowledging That a Plaintiff Has the Right to Take a Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Even If a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued another opinion concerning a plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit in a health care liability action when a motion to dismiss is pending.  The case is Hurley v. Pickens, No. E2015-02089-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Ryan B. Pickens, M.D. and University Urology, P.C. (“Defendants”) alleging claims for health care liability. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of and motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when a motion to dismiss was pending and whether Plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. We find and hold that Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal even while a motion to dismiss was pending. Our resolution of this issue renders Defendants’ second issue moot. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/hurleydkopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff Allowed to Take a Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Despite Pending Motion to Dismiss

Recently the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Clark v. Werther, No. M2014-00844-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in this health care liability action without attaching a certificate of good faith. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing certificate. The plaintiff responded to the motions and filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Some of the defendants objected to the voluntary dismissal, arguing the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff‟s claims against the non-objecting defendants without prejudice but dismissed the plaintiff‟s claims against the objecting defendants with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed all of the court‟s dismissal orders on numerous grounds. Upon review, we conclude that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/clark.robert.v.werther.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff's Case Dismissed Due to Failure to Comply with Presuit and Filing Requirements

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Travis v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center, No. M2015-01989-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, part of Tennessee‟s Health Care Liability Act. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to provide a statement in the pleadings that he complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), failed to file, with the complaint, documentation demonstrating compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), failed to file, with the complaint, an affidavit of the person who mailed pre-suit notice to the defendants, and failed to provide a HIPAA compliant medical authorization form. The trial court dismissed the case. We have reviewed the record and find that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(b). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/travist.opn_.pdf

 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Partial Summary Judgment for Plainitffs as to an Affirmative Defense of Comparative Fault Reversed on Appeal

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Young v. Jordan, No. W2015-02453-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This is a healthcare liability case. Appellees, patient and her husband, filed suit against Appellants, physician and employer. Appellants raised the affirmative defense of comparative fault based on the fact that Appellee/patient had been non-compliant with medical advice. Appellees moved for partial summary judgment on the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The trial court granted the motion, and Appellants appeal. Because expert testimony adduced during discovery creates a dispute of material fact as to the question of Appellees’ non-compliance with medical advice and the effect of such non-compliance on Appellees’ injury, the grant of summary judgment was error.

Here is a link to the opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/youngstephnyopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff Waived Requirement That Defendant File a Certificate of Good Faith to Support Claim Against a New Defendant; Case Against Newly Added Defendant Dimissed Due to Plaintff's Failure to Then File a Certificate of Good Faith in Support of Claim Against the New Defendant

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Peatross v. Graceland Nursing Home Center, LLC, No. W2015-01412-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This is a health care liability action.  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. He then amended his complaint to add the defendant hospital as a party after the defendants alleged comparative fault. The defendant hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the failure to attach a certificate of good faith applicable to it required dismissal. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, citing this court’s opinion in Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, 469 S.W.3d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. 

 (Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to that slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/peatrossopn.pdf

NOTE: This opinion is a good reminder that unless the common-knowledge exception applies in a health care liability action in Tennessee, a certificate of good faith is required to support such a claim---and some party has to file one.

Also, Sirbaugh, supra, is the subject of my Jan. 20, 2015 post on this blog, to wit: http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2015/01/new-health-care-liability-opinion.html.

New Saving Statute Case: Plaintiff's Lawsuit Dismissed Because It Was Refiled for a Second Time More Than One Year from First Voluntary Dismissal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Greenwood v. Nat'l Dentex Corp., No. W2015-01889-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a saving statute case, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s third product-liability case, which was filed within one year of the dismissal of her second lawsuit, but more than one year after the entry of the initial nonsuit in Appellant’s first lawsuit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: 

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/greenwoodchristineopn.pdf

As my good friend Donald Capparella says: "Nonsuits are tricky."  They certainly are!