New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Tennessee Supreme Court Holds That a HIPAA-compliant Medical Authorization Is Not Required to Be Sent When Only One Defendant Is Being Sent Presuit Notice of a Potential Claim

The Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion today in Bray v. Khuri, No. W2015-00397-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Jul. 5, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) requires a person who asserts a potential claim for healthcare liability to include with pre-suit notice a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization permitting the healthcare provider who receives the notice to obtain complete medical records “from each other provider being sent the notice.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Here, the plaintiff sent pre-suit notice of her claim to a single healthcare provider and included a medical authorization. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendant healthcare provider moved to dismiss, asserting the plaintiff had failed to provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. The trial court granted the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that a prospective plaintiff who provides pre-suit notice to one potential defendant is not required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) to provide the single potential defendant with a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 

(Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/braydeborah.opn_.pdf

NOTE: This decision is correct and a commonsense construction of Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E).  My hat's off to the Tennessee Supreme Court for this decision.

New Laws Effective in Tennessee on July 1, 2017

Here is an abstract of the new laws that go into effect in Tennessee on July 1, 2017, to wit:

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/effective07-01-2017.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Defense Upheld on Appeal Due to Lack of Sufficient Expert Testimony

The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, released its opinion Graham v. Family Cancer Center, PLLC, No. W2016-00859-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 5, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This is a medical malpractice action.  The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendants concerning the failure to timely diagnose the husband’s prostate cancer. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient expert testimony to establish their claim. The court agreed and granted summary judgment. We affirm.

(Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/grahamsamuelopn.pdf

New NIED Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Claim Reversed on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, issued its opinion in Henderson v. Vanderbilt University, No. M2016-01876-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant hospital on the ground hat the plaintiffs could not establish that they witnessed or perceived an injury-producing event for purposes of their negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. We hold that the alleged failure of the defendant hospital to provide care to the plaintiffs’ daughter, despite repeated assurances from the hospital that it would occur, constitutes an injury-producing event that was witnessed by plaintiffs. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claims on this basis.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/henderson.rodney.opn_.pdf

Here is a link to Judge Gibson's dissent:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/henderson.rodney.diss_.opn_.pdf

NOTE: The majority opinion does a good job of outlining the current state of NIED claims in Tennessee.

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Mother's Claim as Being Time-barred Upheld on Appeal; Trial Court's Dismissal of Child's Claim Is Reversed, However, Due to Extension of Statute of Repose via Proper Presuit Notification to Defendants of That Claim

The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Western Section, issued its opinion in Woodruff v. Walker, No. W2016-01895-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

The plaintiffs, a mother and her child, filed this health care liability action in September 2015. The complaint alleged that both plaintiffs suffered permanent injuries resulting from the defendant health care providers’ negligent care during the child’s birth in June 2012. The defendants moved to dismiss the mother’s claims based on expiration of the one-year statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(1) and to dismiss the claims of both plaintiffs based on expiration of the three-year statute of repose in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116(a)(3). With regard to the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs argued that the mother’s claims were timely filed because the discovery rule delayed the accrual of her claims until March 2015 and because she had been “adjudicated incompetent” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 such that the limitations period was tolled as to her claims. With regard to the statute of repose, the plaintiffs argued that their claims were timely filed because they were entitled to rely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), which extends the three-year statute of repose by 120 days when sufficient pre-suit notice is given. Following a hearing, the trial court concluded that neither the discovery rule nor Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-106 applied to the mother’s claims and that her claims were therefore filed after expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Additionally, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient presuit notice because the medical authorizations included in their pre-suit notice did not permit the defendants to obtain their complete medical records. Specifically, the trial court found the authorizations insufficient because they did not permit the defendants to obtain relevant medical records from prenatal treatment that the mother received prior to the date of the delivery. The trial court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to rely on the 120-day extended filing period and their claims were filed after expiration of the three-year statute of repose. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims, and the plaintiffs appealed. Having reviewed the record submitted on appeal, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the mother’s claims based on expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. We further hold, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing the child’s claims based on expiration of the three-year statute of repose. Records from prenatal treatment that the mother received prior to the date of the delivery were the mother’s medical records, and the child could not have unilaterally authorized their release. As such, his failure to do so did not render the medical authorizations provided with his pre-suit notice insufficient. The defendants have not asserted any other deficiencies in the child’s pre-suit notice. Because the child provided sufficient pre-suit notice, he was entitled to rely on Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c), which extended the filing period by 120 days. The child’s claims were therefore timely filed prior to expiration of the extended statute of repose in October 2015. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/woodruffjoshlinopn.pdf

Twenty-five Years of Modified Comparative Fault in Tennessee

On May 4, 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted a system of modified comparative fault in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992).  The petition for rehearing was denied June 1, 1992. Accordingly, we are in the midst of the twenty-fifth anniversary of McIntyre.

The significance of that case cannot be understated.  Its affect upon Tennessee tort law remains strong even today.  It is worth rereading on occasion. As such, here is a link to that case:

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1993852268612836205&q=mcintyre+v+balentine&hl=en&as_sdt=4,43

Defense Verdict Upheld on Appeal in an Auto Tort Case

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Higgins v. Green, No. M2016-01369-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 11, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This appeal arises from a two-car accident. In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that the collision occurred because Defendant violated several statutory rules of the road by failing to yield the right of way and making a turn across traffic without confirming it was safe to do so. Defendant denied any negligence and claimed that Plaintiff was more than 50% at fault. Following a trial, the jury found that Plaintiff was 75% at fault; as a result, judgment was entered for Defendant. On appeal Plaintiff contends she is entitled to a new trial for two reasons. She contends the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the testimony of the investigating police officer to what the parties told him at the scene and to matters that are reflected in his accident report. She also contends she is entitled to a new trial due to jury misconduct. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/higgs.kim_.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Dismissal of Pro Se Plaintiff's Claims by Trial Court Upheld on Appeal in Part

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Lacy v. Saint Thomas Hospital West, No. M2016-01272-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2017).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

Appellant brought a pro se action against several medical providers for injuries sustained when she was allegedly beaten during medical procedures. The trial court dismissed the complaint, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02, for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (THCLA). On appeal, Appellant contends that she was not obligated to comply with the THCLA’s procedural requirements because her claim was based in tort and did not assert a health care liability claim. After reviewing the complaint, we conclude that it asserts several distinct claims, some of which are health care liability claims and some are not. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the health care liability claims, but reverse the trial court’s grant of Appellees’ motions to dismiss the non-health care liability claims. 

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/lacy.deborahv.saintthomas.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: The Common-knowledge Exception Dispenses with the Need to File a Certificate of Good Faith

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Zink v. Rural/Metro of Tenn., L.P., No. E2016-01581-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion reads:

In this action regarding injury allegedly caused by an emergency medical technician in the course of rendering medical aid, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”) and dismissed the claims with prejudice based on the plaintiff’s failure to file a certificate of good faith pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. The plaintiff has appealed, conceding that his claims sounded in health care liability but asserting that they should not have been dismissed with prejudice because a certificate of good faith was not required. Following our review of the complaint, we conclude that the plaintiff’s claims were subject to the common knowledge exception such that a certificate of good faith was not required pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims without prejudice based upon his failure to provide pre-suit notice.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/zink_opinion.pdf

NOTE: This opinion makes clear that certificates of good faith are only required to be filed with a complaint in a health care liability action when the common-knowledge exception does not apply, which can be tricky to determine.

How a Defendant's Bankruptcy Affects the Timeliness of a Tort Action Filed Against That Defendant

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued an excellent opinion that sets out how a defendant's bankruptcy affect the timeliness of a tort action filed against the defendant in McCollough v. Vaughn, 

No. M2016-01458-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This action arises out of a two-car accident. Prior to the commencement of this action, the driver of the vehicle who is the defendant in this action filed a petition in bankruptcy court. Shortly thereafter, and being unaware of the bankruptcy proceeding, Plaintiffs commenced this action naming the driver of the other vehicle as the only named defendant. Summons was issued for the defendant driver as well as Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier. Summons was served on the carrier; however, summons for Defendant was returned unserved, and more than a year passed before Plaintiffs requested issuance of an alias summons. Upon motions of the defendant and the uninsured motorist carrier, the trial court dismissed all claims as time barred upon the finding that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 by obtaining the issuance of a new summons for service of process on the defendant within one year of the issuance of the previous summons that was not served. Plaintiffs appeal contending their claims are not time barred because the defendant filed her bankruptcy petition prior to the commencement of this action and Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-109 expressly states, “When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction, the time of the continuance of the injunction is not to be counted.” We agree. The bankruptcy court’s automatic stay not only enjoined the commencement of this action but the issuance of process, and Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-109 expressly states that the time of the continuance of an injunction is not to be counted in calculating the statute of limitations. The bankruptcy injunction remained in effect for 202 days; therefore, that period is not to be counted. With the addition of 202 days to the period within which Plaintiffs could obtain the issuance of an alias summons under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3, the issuance of the alias summons was timely. As a consequence, the trial court’s order dismissing this case is vacated, and this matter is remanded with instructions to reinstate the complaint as to the defendant driver and the uninsured motorist carrier for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/mccullough.robert.opn_.pdf

NOTE: This is a must-read opinion for any Tennessee practitioner who handles tort cases.

Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Defense Overturned on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Helyukh v. Buddy Head Livestock & Trucking, Inc., No. W2015-01354-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

The plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment in a negligence case. One of the plaintiffs, a truck driver, suffered injuries stemming from a collision with another tractor- trailer owned by the defendant and operated by its employee. The plaintiffs claimed that the employee's negligence proximately caused the accident. The owner of the overturned tractor-trailer moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish that its employee's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue, among other things, that owner of the overturned tractor-trailed failed to meet its burden of production in moving for summary judgment. Because we conclude that the movant failed to demonstrate the absence of material facts that would create genuine issues for trial, we reverse the grant of summary judgment.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/helyukhvopn.pdf

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on Res Ipsa Loquitur

The Tennessee Supreme Court recently issued its opinion in Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling, No. E2014-01612-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Apr. 5, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion reads as follows:

At issue in this appeal is the liability of a general contractor and two flooring subcontractors for damages sustained by the plaintiffs when a fire destroyed their partially completed house. The plaintiffs alleged that the negligence of the general contractor and the subcontractors caused the fire and that the general contractor had breached the construction contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the general contractor, holding that the plaintiffs could not rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish an inference of negligence; granted summary judgment to the subcontractors based on the plaintiffs' failure to prove that any negligence of the subcontractors caused the fire; and granted summary judgment to the general contractor based on evidence that the plaintiffs were the first party to materially breach the construction contract. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed summary judgment to the general contractor based on the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur; and reversed summary judgment to the subcontractors on the negligence claim and to the general contractor on the breach of contract claim, finding genuine issues of disputed material fact. We hold that the plaintiffs cannot rely on res ipsa loquitur because they did not produce sufficient evidence that the general contractor was in exclusive control of the specific cause or all reasonably probable causes of the fire. We further hold that the plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that any negligence of the subcontractors was the cause in fact of the fire. For these reasons, the general contractor and flooring subcontractors are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims based on negligence and breach of contract. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/jenkinse.opn_.pdf

New Opinion: Trial Court's Remittitur of Jury Verdict Upheld on Appeal

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Eastern Grand Division, issued its opinion in West v. Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC, No. E2016-01860-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2017). Here is a link to the syllabus from the slip opinion:  

This appeal concerns a jury award of damages in a negligence case. Suzanne Bishop West (“West”) sued Epiphany Salon & Day Spa, LLC (“Epiphany”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) for damages resulting from a facial she received that burned her face. Epiphany conceded liability and the matter went before a jury for a determination of damages. The jury awarded West $125,000 in damages. Epiphany filed a motion for remittitur. The Trial Court, finding the award excessive, reduced the award from $125,000 to $47,800. West appeals to this Court, asking that we restore the original jury award of $125,000. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/west_v._epiphany_salon.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Defense Verdict Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued its opinion in Popick v. Vanderbilt University Hospital, No. M2015-01271-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2017).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

The plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant hospital after the death of her husband, alleging that his death was the result of negligent medical treatment. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court committed reversible error in: (1) excluding certain email messages as hearsay; (2) overruling her objections to defense counsel‟s crossexamination of a witness; (3) failing to instruct the jury to ignore statements made by defense counsel in closing argument; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction; and (5) declining to change the special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/popick.elizabeth.opn_.pdf

New Opinion: Dismissal of Plaintiff's Case Overturned on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Cordell v. Cleveland Tennessee Hospital, LLC, No. M2016-01466-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

The trial court, pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by defendants, dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit because she did not comply with certain aspects of the Tennessee Healthcare Liability Act incident to the filing of her original complaint. Because we do not construe the allegations in the original complaint as presenting any health care liability claims, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this lawsuit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/cordell.opn_.pdf

  

New Opinion on Protective Orders and Their Modification

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Autin v. Goetz, No. W2016-00099-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017).  It is a good read on protective orders and their modification.   Here is the syllabus form the slip opinion:

The trial court entered a protective order under Rule 26.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure while the case was ongoing. After the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order confirming the dismissal and extending the protective order "in perpetuity."  The defendant did not appeal the final order, but years later filed a motion to modify the protective order. The trial court denied the motion as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to extend the protective order after plaintiffs nonsuited their case. As an issue of first impression, we conclude that the trial court retained jurisdiction to extend and modify its previously entered protective order notwithstanding the voluntary dismissal of the underlying action. We further hold that modification of existing protective orders is authorized by the holding in Ballard v. Herzke, 924 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tenn. 1996); accordingly, we vacate the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to modify and remand for reconsideration in light of our supreme court's established precedent.

(Bolding in original.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/autindopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Jury Verdict for Defense Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Bogner v. Vanderbilt University, No. M2015-00669-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2017).  he syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendant in a health care liability action. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant hospital for medical malpractice, medical battery, and lack of informed consent. The trial court granted a partial directed verdict in favor of the defendant after the plaintiff presented evidence. At the close of all the proof, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict on the remaining issues of medical battery and informed consent. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict, in refusing to adopt the plaintiff's special jury instructions, and in using a confusing special verdict form. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/bogner.james_.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Action Upheld on Appeal Due to Ineffective HIPAA Authorization

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Rush v. Jackson Surgical Assocs., P.A., W2016-01289-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2017).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a healthcare liability action. After sustaining injuries as a result of alleged surgical error, Appellant filed this action against the surgeon and his medical group. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/rushgeraldopn.pdf

NOTE: The syllabus is short and sweet and you have to read the opinion to get an idea of why the case was dismissed.  However, I direct you to my blog post of Nov. 19, 2016, which supports my belief that defendants in a health care liability action do not need a HIPAA-compliant authorization to review a patient's PHI/medical records, and, as result, cannot be "prejudiced" by not getting such an authorization as part of a claimant's presuit notice, to wit: 

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2016/11/new-health-care-liability-action.html

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Decision Finding That Presuit Notice Was Effective and Grant of Leave to Amend Complaint Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Runions v. Jackson-Madison County Hospital District, No. W2016-00901-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this health care liability action, we must determine whether the plaintiff properly complied with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). The original defendants in this matter all filed a motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment alleging that they did not provide medical treatment to the plaintiff/appellee. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a response to the defendants' motion acknowledging that she had mistakenly identified a proper defendant in this suit. The plaintiff also filed a motion to amend her complaint attempting to remedy that mistake by substituting in the proper defendant. After both motions were heard, the trial court denied the original defendants' motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff/appellee's motion to amend her complaint. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Here is a link to the opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/runionstopn.pdf

Judge Gibson issued a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which can be found at this link: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/runionstiffinnedis.pdf

NOTE: This case was reversed on appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court on Jun. 6, 2018.  That opinion can be found at this link, to wit:

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2018/06/new-tennessee-supreme-court-health-care.html

New Wrongful Death Opinion: Surviving Spouse's Prosecution of Claim Disallowed on Appeal; Decedent's Daughter Allowed to Prosecute Claim Instead

The Tennessee Court of Appeals, Middle Section, just released its opinion in Nelson v. Myres, No. M2015-01857-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017). The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

A woman died in a multi-vehicle accident. Two wrongful death actions were filed, one by the woman's daughter, the other by the woman's husband. The daughter's suit named the husband and others as defendants. The husband's suit named one of the other drivers as the only defendant. The trial court dismissed the daughter's complaint, holding that Tennessee's wrongful death statute creates only one cause of action and that the husband, as the surviving spouse, was granted priority to prosecute the action under the statute. The daughter appeals the dismissal of her complaint. Because the husband is unable to name himself as a defendant in the suit he has filed, he is not able to prosecute the wrongful death action in a manner consistent with the right of the decedent to sue all wrongdoers whose actions are alleged to have led to her death; accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court dismissing the daughter's complaint, reinstate the complaint, and remand the case for further proceedings.

(Emphasis added.)

 Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/nelson.brittany.opn_.pdf

NOTE: This is a must-read opinion for any Tennessee practitioner who handles wrongful death claims.  

New Laws Effective in Tennessee on Jan. 1, 2017

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/effective%2001-01-2017.pdf

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion: Seller of Automated External Defibrillator Granted Summary Judgment on Appeal

The Tennessee Supreme Court just issued its opinion in Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, No. E2015-01827-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff‟s husband collapsed and died after participating in a cycling class at a fitness and recreation facility owned and operated by the church. Although the cycling class instructor and others present at the fitness facility attended the plaintiff's husband and called 911 soon after his collapse, they did not utilize the automated external defibrillator (“AED”) on site at the facility. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the church, alleging, among other things, that the church had negligently failed to utilize the onsite AED, to train facility personnel on the proper use of the AED, and to comply with applicable state statutes. The church denied negligence and subsequently filed a third-party complaint against the company that sold it the AED, asserting that the seller had contractually agreed to provide a physician oversight program, which, among other things, included oversight of the church's compliance with federal, state, and local regulations. The church alleged that, should the plaintiff recover a judgment against it for failing to comply with statutes, the seller should be solely responsible for the judgment. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint naming the seller as a defendant and alleging, as relevant to this interlocutory appeal, that: (1) the seller had negligently breached a duty it owed to her husband and others using the fitness facility to properly maintain the AEDs, to ensure that they were accessible, and to ensure that the church's employees had the knowledge, training, and ability to operate the AEDs; (2) the seller had breached its contract with the church; (3) her husband was a third-party beneficiary of the contract; and (4) the seller's negligence and breaches of contract caused her husband's death, entitling her to recover against the seller on her wrongful death and loss of consortium claims.

The seller moved for summary judgment against the plaintiff and the church, arguing that: (1) it owed no duty of care to the plaintiff or her husband; (2) the church had no common law or statutory duty to acquire or use an AED; (3) neither the plaintiff nor her husband were third-party beneficiaries of the seller's contract with the church; (4) the undisputed facts established that the seller had not breached its contract with the church; and (5) the undisputed facts failed to establish that any of the alleged breaches of contract caused the plaintiff‟s husband's death. The trial court denied the seller's motion for summary judgment, concluding that disputes of material fact remained, but it granted the seller permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the seller's application for an interlocutory appeal, but this Court granted the seller permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We conclude that the seller did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff's husband or other users of the fitness facility independent of its contract with the church and that the church had no statutory or common law duty to acquire or use the AED it purchased from the seller, and as a result, the plaintiff's husband was not a third-party beneficiary of the church's contract with the seller. For these reasons, the seller is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's second amended complaint and the church's third-party complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the seller on all claims and for any other necessary and appropriate proceedings consistent with this decision.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/wallissopn.pdf.

NOTE: In addition to the discussion on the law surrounding the seller of an AED's liability in Tennessee, this opinion sheds further light on the post-Rye summary judgment standard in our state, which makes it a must-read for that fact alone.

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Exclusion of Plaintiff's Treating Physician as a Causation Expert and Resulting Grant of Summary Judgment to the Defense Reveresed on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Holmes v. Christ Community Health Services, Inc., No. W2016-00207-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff filed this action alleging medical malpractice against a physician who examined the plaintiff five days after injury to her shoulder, as well as the facility wherein the physician practiced. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant physician failed to properly diagnose a fracture dislocation in her shoulder, causing a delay in appropriate treatment. The plaintiff‘s subsequent treating physician opined in his deposition and via affidavit that if the plaintiff‘s injury had been diagnosed earlier, the plaintiff would likely have avoided an extensive surgical procedure, resultant infection stemming from such surgery, and residual impairment to her shoulder. The trial court excluded this testimony as speculative, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physician and hospital. The plaintiff has appealed. We determine that the trial court erred in excluding the causation evidence as speculative. We therefore vacate the court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the co-defendants.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/holmesdopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal Based upon Claim Being Time-barred for Failure to Comply with Onerous Presuit Notice Requirements Upheld on Appeal; Constitutional Challenge of Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121 Deemed to Be Without Merit

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in J.A.C. ex rel. Lesha Carter v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hospitals, No. W2016-00024-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2016).  The syllabus from the opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability action, Defendants moved to dismiss based on the Plaintiffs' failure to provide the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") medical authorization required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Based on its determination that the Plaintiffs failed to substantially comply with the foregoing statute, the trial court held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to an extension of the applicable statutes of limitations and repose under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) and accordingly concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. The trial court also concluded that the Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the viability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 were without merit. We affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/carterleshaopn.pdf

NOTE: I find it interesting that the courts in Tennessee---and many lawyers---have not picked up on the fact that a defendant (or potential defendant) in a health care liability action does not have to have a HIPAA-compliant authorization to share a patient's or plaintiff's protected health information ("PHI") with other defendants and their legal counsel under 45 C.F.R. sections 164.501, -502(b), -.514(d) to investigate potential medical negligence.  See http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/705/may-a-covered-entity-in-a-legal-proceeding-use-protected-health-information/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).  As such, dismissal of a health care liability action because a defendant did not get a HIPAA-compliant authorization for a patient's PHI would be improper because Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121's requirement that such an authorization be enclosed as part of a claimant's presuit notice appears to be preempted by HIPAA. 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Common-knowledge Exception Applies to the Breach of Duty But Not to Causation; Trial Court's Dimissal with Prejudice Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Redick v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2016-00428-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:  

Vicki J. Redick (“Plaintiff”) appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her health care liability action against Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital (“the Hospital”) and Jane Doe, an employee of the Hospital. We find and hold that Plaintiff, despite application of the common knowledge exception when appropriate, would be unable to prove her claim without expert proof, and therefore, Plaintiff was required to file a certificate of good faith in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. As Plaintiff failed to file the required certificate of good faith, we find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) dismissing Plaintiff‟s case with prejudice for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/redickv.j.opn_.pdf

NOTE: In this opinion, the court held that while the common-knowledge exception applied to the breach of duty, Redick v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital, No. M2016-00428-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at  8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2016), it did not apply to causation, inter alia, because what injuries the plaintiff suffered were not within the common knowledge of laypersons (unlike when a wrong body part is operated on or a foreign object is unintentionally left in a patient's body after surgery), id. 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Refiled Case Overturned on Appeal Due to the Saving Statute

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Robinson v. Robbins, No. W2016-00381-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1996).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a health care liability action.  The plaintiffs timely filed suit against the defendant concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. After voluntarily dismissing the initial suit, the plaintiffs provided pre-suit notice before filing a second suit pursuant to the saving statute. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the saving statute did not apply because there was no identity of parties between the actions. He explained that the second complaint was filed against him in his individual capacity while the initial complaint was lodged against him in his corporate capacity. The court agreed and held that the second action was barred for failure to file within the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse.

 (Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/robinsonmyrtleopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Another Opinion Acknowledging That a Plaintiff Has the Right to Take a Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Even If a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending

The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued another opinion concerning a plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit in a health care liability action when a motion to dismiss is pending.  The case is Hurley v. Pickens, No. E2015-02089-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

Dallas K. Hurley, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) sued Ryan B. Pickens, M.D. and University Urology, P.C. (“Defendants”) alleging claims for health care liability. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. While the motion to dismiss was pending, Plaintiff filed a notice of and motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. The Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants appeal to this Court raising issues regarding whether Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when a motion to dismiss was pending and whether Plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 requiring dismissal of Plaintiff’s suit with prejudice. We find and hold that Plaintiff had the right to take a voluntary dismissal even while a motion to dismiss was pending. Our resolution of this issue renders Defendants’ second issue moot. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order granting Plaintiff a voluntary dismissal.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/hurleydkopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff Allowed to Take a Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Despite Pending Motion to Dismiss

Recently the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Clark v. Werther, No. M2014-00844-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a complaint in this health care liability action without attaching a certificate of good faith. Several defendants filed motions to dismiss based on the missing certificate. The plaintiff responded to the motions and filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Some of the defendants objected to the voluntary dismissal, arguing the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff‟s claims against the non-objecting defendants without prejudice but dismissed the plaintiff‟s claims against the objecting defendants with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed all of the court‟s dismissal orders on numerous grounds. Upon review, we conclude that Rule 41.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure afforded the plaintiff the right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/clark.robert.v.werther.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff's Case Dismissed Due to Failure to Comply with Presuit and Filing Requirements

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Travis v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center, No. M2015-01989-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, part of Tennessee‟s Health Care Liability Act. Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to provide a statement in the pleadings that he complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), failed to file, with the complaint, documentation demonstrating compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a), failed to file, with the complaint, an affidavit of the person who mailed pre-suit notice to the defendants, and failed to provide a HIPAA compliant medical authorization form. The trial court dismissed the case. We have reviewed the record and find that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(b). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/travist.opn_.pdf

 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Partial Summary Judgment for Plainitffs as to an Affirmative Defense of Comparative Fault Reversed on Appeal

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Young v. Jordan, No. W2015-02453-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This is a healthcare liability case. Appellees, patient and her husband, filed suit against Appellants, physician and employer. Appellants raised the affirmative defense of comparative fault based on the fact that Appellee/patient had been non-compliant with medical advice. Appellees moved for partial summary judgment on the affirmative defense of comparative fault. The trial court granted the motion, and Appellants appeal. Because expert testimony adduced during discovery creates a dispute of material fact as to the question of Appellees’ non-compliance with medical advice and the effect of such non-compliance on Appellees’ injury, the grant of summary judgment was error.

Here is a link to the opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/youngstephnyopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff Waived Requirement That Defendant File a Certificate of Good Faith to Support Claim Against a New Defendant; Case Against Newly Added Defendant Dimissed Due to Plaintff's Failure to Then File a Certificate of Good Faith in Support of Claim Against the New Defendant

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Peatross v. Graceland Nursing Home Center, LLC, No. W2015-01412-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2016).  Here is the syllabus from the slip opinion:

This is a health care liability action.  The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants concerning the inadequate care and treatment received by the decedent. He then amended his complaint to add the defendant hospital as a party after the defendants alleged comparative fault. The defendant hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the failure to attach a certificate of good faith applicable to it required dismissal. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, citing this court’s opinion in Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt University, 469 S.W.3d 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. 

 (Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to that slip opinion: http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/peatrossopn.pdf

NOTE: This opinion is a good reminder that unless the common-knowledge exception applies in a health care liability action in Tennessee, a certificate of good faith is required to support such a claim---and some party has to file one.

Also, Sirbaugh, supra, is the subject of my Jan. 20, 2015 post on this blog, to wit: http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2015/01/new-health-care-liability-opinion.html.

New Saving Statute Case: Plaintiff's Lawsuit Dismissed Because It Was Refiled for a Second Time More Than One Year from First Voluntary Dismissal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Greenwood v. Nat'l Dentex Corp., No. W2015-01889-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a saving statute case, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s third product-liability case, which was filed within one year of the dismissal of her second lawsuit, but more than one year after the entry of the initial nonsuit in Appellant’s first lawsuit. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Here is a link to the slip opinion: 

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/greenwoodchristineopn.pdf

As my good friend Donald Capparella says: "Nonsuits are tricky."  They certainly are!

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Summary Judgment for Defense Upheld on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Duncan v. Ledford, No. W2015-02370-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2015).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a healthcare liability case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Appellant’s treating physician and her employer. Summary judgment was based on the trial court’s finding that Appellants had failed to meet their burden of proof to show that Appellee doctor deviated from the standard of care or that the treatment provided caused Appellant to sustain injuries that otherwise would not have occurred. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/duncanopn.pdf

What Is Required to Maintain a Personl Injury Lawsuit When the Plaintiff Dies from a Subsequent Injury Unrelated to the Injury That Birthed the Personal Injury Lawsuit

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Dubis v. Loyd, No. W2015-02192-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2016).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:

After the death of the original plaintiff while this case was pending, a timely motion for substitution was filed to substitute the original plaintiff's parents as the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 25.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion indicated that the original plaintiff‟s parents were her only heirs and that no estate was to be opened for the original plaintiff in her home state of Missouri. The defendant filed an objection to the substitution asserting that the original plaintiff's heirs were not the proper parties, but the trial court eventually allowed parents to be substituted as plaintiffs. After the parties became aware that an estate had been opened for the original plaintiff in Missouri, defendant filed a motion to dismiss based upon non-compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated [s]ection 20-5-104, which requires a showing that no person is willing to administer the estate of a deceased party before his or her heirs may revive a claim. Parents filed a response in opposition and, in the alternative, a motion for enlargement of time to file a motion to substitute the original plaintiff‟s personal representative. The trial court denied the motion for enlargement of time and granted the defendant‟s motion to dismiss. Because parents have shown excusable neglect sufficient to justify an enlargement of time under Rule 6.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/dubiskopn.pdf

NOTE: I applaud the Court of Appeals here because Tennessee has a long-standing, well-thought-out policy of allowing claims to be resolved upon their merits and not upon procedural technicalities, which is noted on page 12 of the opinion.

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff's Case Dismissed Due to Counsel's Failure to Comply with Onerous Presuit Notice and Filing Requirements; Common-knowledge Exception Found Not to Apply

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Newman v. Guardian Healthcare Providers, Inc., No. M2015-01315-COA-R3-CV (Jul. 27, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

On August 4, 2013, Kevin Beazley, a resident at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute (MTMHI), attacked Billy Joe Newman, another patient and resident, causing injuries that resulted in Newman‟s death. His widow, Unitta Sue Newman (plaintiff), brought this action against several corporations (defendants) that provided nursing and medical staff to MTMHI. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, on the grounds that it was governed by the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (THCLA), and plaintiff did not comply with either the pre-suit notice requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2015), or the certificate of good faith requirement of § 29-26-122 (2012). Plaintiff argues that the allegations of her complaint fall under the “common knowledge” exception to the general rule requiring expert testimony to establish medical negligence, and, thus, she was not required to file a certificate of good faith. She asserts that the trial court should have dismissed her complaint without prejudice. Because plaintiff‟s negligence claims involve matters of professional medical knowledge, judgment, and treatment not within the common knowledge of ordinary lay persons, we affirm.

Here's a link to the slip opinion, to wit:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/newman.unittav.guardianhealthcareproviders.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Court of Appeals Reverses Grant of Summary Judgment to Defense; Extraordinary Cause Found to Exist, Which Excused Compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(b)

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Kirby v. Sumner County Regional Medical Center, No. M2015-01181-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 12, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

This is a health care liability action.  The plaintiff suffered permanent damage after receiving medical treatment from the defendant hospital. The plaintiff filed suit exactly one year after her hospital stay. The defendant hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to comply with the pre-suit notice and good faith requirements applicable to health care liability actions. The plaintiff later argued that the failure to comply with the necessary requirements should be excused for extraordinary cause as evidenced by the passing of her legal counsel‟s son four days prior to the filing of the complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that no extraordinary cause existed. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

(Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

 http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/kirbybetty.opn.pdf

NOTE: If EVER there was a case where "extraordinary cause" existed, which would excuse compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(b), it is this case.  Plaintiff's counsel's infant son passed away, which prevented Plaintiff's counsel from complying with -121(b). 

New Opinion on Sudden Emergency and Loss of Consciousness: Trial Court's Jury Instructions Held Not to Be Error on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Boshears v. Brooks, No. E2015-01915-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 6, 2016).  The syllabus from the slip opinion states as follows:

This appeal arises from a negligence case brought after an automobile accident. James Boshears (“Boshears”) was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his girlfriend that was struck by a vehicle driven by Cleave C. Brooks (“Brooks”). Boshears sued Brooks in the Circuit Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”). Boshears alleged that Brooks was negligent in operating his vehicle. Brooks asserted that he suffered a stroke immediately prior to the accident, that he lost consciousness, and that, consequently, he could not be found negligent. The case was tried to a jury. The jury found that Brooks was not at fault. Boshears appealed to this Court. On appeal, Boshears argues that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury with sudden emergency when comparative fault was not raised by Brooks. Boshears also asserts that the Trial Court erred in charging the jury on both sudden emergency and loss of consciousness. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/boshearsjopn.pdf

Happy Independence Day!

I almost talked myself out of posting this video clip (why, I don't know), but then I thought better of it; here it is: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DSKOx8DKPIg.

I love this video!  I have since I first came across it years ago.

And, as John Adams wrote:

[I] am apt to believe that [Independence Day] will be celebrated by succeeding generations as the great anniversary festival. It ought to be commemorated as the day of deliverance by solemn acts of devotion to God Almighty; it ought to be solemnized with pomp and parade, with shows, games, sports, guns, bells, bonfires and illuminations from one end of this continent to the other, from this time forward forever more....

Available at https://www.nps.gov/subjects/nationalmall4th/history-of-independence-day.htm (last visited Jul. 4, 2016).

Celebrate the liberty we enjoy this day; and teach your kids why we do so, too. 

My two cents' worth.

New Laws Effective in Tennessee on Jul. 1, 2016

http://www.wbbjtv.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/New-Tennessee-Laws.pdf

Link repaired as if Dec. 20, 2016.

New Opinion on the Collateral Source Rule

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Dedmon v. Steelman, No. W2015-01462-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 2, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

This interlocutory appeal requires review of a ruling on a motion in limine in a personal injury case. Prior to trial, the plaintiffs submitted expert testimony from a treating physician to establish the reasonableness of their claimed medical expenses. The defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of what they deemed ―unreasonable‖ medical expenses. They argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court‘s decision in West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corporation, 459 S.W.3d 33 (Tenn. 2014), established a new standard in Tennessee for determining the reasonable amount of medical expenses as a matter of law. The trial court granted the defendants‘ motion in limine, thus excluding the testimony of the treating physician. For the following reasons, the trial court‘s order is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

Here are the links to the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by the special judge:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/dedmonjeanopn_0.pdf

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/dedmonjeancon_0.pdf

New Opinion on Qualified Protective Orders under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(f)

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Caldwell v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, No. W2015-01076-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 3, 2016).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability action, this Court granted the defendants‟ application pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to address two issues. We have determined that: (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) does not preempt Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f); and (2) the trial court erred in denying the defendants‟ petition for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(f) because it is undisputed that the defendants complied with the procedural requirements of subsection (f), and the plaintiff did not file an objection as permitted under the statute. We, therefore, reverse the trial court‟s decision and remand for the entry of a qualified protective order.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/caldwellaopn.pdf

Trial Court's Denial of Summary Judgment Reversed and Summary Judgment for Defendant Granted Due to Express Assumption of Risk

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Gibson v. Young Men's Christian Association of Middle Tennessee, No. M2015-01465-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 16, 2016).  The summary form the slip opinion states as follows:

This is an appeal from an order denying summary judgment. The appellee signed a YMCA membership application and release agreement prior to tripping and falling on a sidewalk in front of the YMCA. The appellee filed suit, alleging negligence. The YMCA then filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the appellee expressly assumed the risk of her injuries. The trial court denied the YMCA’s motion for summary judgment but granted a motion for interlocutory appeal. We reverse the trial court’s order denying summary judgment and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/gibsonsandraopn.pdf

NOTE: This opinion is a good reminder of how express assumption of risk might affect a tort case.

New Wrongful Death Opinion: Trial Court's Disqualification of Surviving Spouse under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-107(b) Reversed on Appeal

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Spires v. Simpson, No. E2015-00697-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2016).  The summary from the opinion reads as follows:

The surviving spouse in this wrongful death action appeals the trial court‟s dismissal of him as a plaintiff. The decedent and surviving spouse had one child together, who was eighteen months old at the time of the decedent‟s fatal automobile accident in October 2010. The decedent and surviving spouse were living apart, and the child had been residing solely with the decedent. On November 18, 2010, the surviving spouse, acting on behalf of the decedent, the child, and himself, filed the instant action in the Monroe County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against the seventeen-year-old driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident and her parents, who were the owners of the vehicle.  Also in November 2010, the Monroe County Juvenile Court granted custody of the child to the maternal grandmother. Upon a subsequent petition filed by the maternal grandmother and maternal uncle in the Blount County Chancery Court, the surviving spouse's parental rights to the child were terminated and a decree of adoption was granted to the maternal uncle on August 8, 2012. The child's maternal grandmother and adoptive father subsequently filed successive motions to intervene in this action on behalf o[f] the child. Upon announcement of an agreement as to the settlement amount offered by the defendants' insurance company, the trial court entered an agreed order awarding a $100,000.00 judgment against the defendants.  Following a bench trial regarding the remaining issues, the court found that pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-5-107(b), the surviving spouse was statutorily disqualified from commencing and maintaining this action or collecting any portion of a settlement because he owed outstanding child support arrearages on behalf of children born to four women other than the decedent. We determine that although Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-5-107(b) operates to prohibit the surviving spouse's recovery of his one-half of the settlement until his child support obligations are paid, it does not operate to disqualify him from commencing and maintaining this wrongful death action. We therefore reverse the trial court's dismissal of the surviving spouse as a plaintiff and the court's substitution of the adoptive father as an intervening plaintiff. We remand for distribution of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, one-half toward payment of the surviving spouse's child support arrearages with interest, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-5-107(b), and one-half to the minor child in trust with the adoptive father as trustee. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

Here is a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/spires_opinion_final_corrected.pdf

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on the Saving Statute

On March 7, 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its opinion in Circle C Construction, LLC v. D. Sean Nilsen, No. M2013-02330-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2016).  The summary from the majority opinion states as follows:

The issue we address is whether the savings statute applies to save an action that was filed within the extended statute of limitations set by a tolling agreement, was voluntarily nonsuited, and was refiled within one year, but after the extended statute of limitations in the tolling agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment, ruling that the case was not timely filed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tolling agreement precluded application of the savings statute. We hold that the party filing the suit complied with the tolling agreement by filing the first suit within the extended statute of limitations set by the agreement. The savings statute applies to save the action; therefore, the refiled suit was timely filed. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court.

Here is a link to the majority opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/circlecconstruction.opn_.pdf

Here is a link to Justice Kirby's opinion where She concurs in part and dissents in part:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/circlecconstruction.sepopn.pdf

NOTE: This is a good read for the Tennessee practitioner.

New Wrongful Death Opinion: Hataway Redux

On March 11, 2016 the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Sterchi v. Savard, No. E2015-00928-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2016).  This opinion involves a wrongful death case where the death actually occurred in Florida but suit was filed here in Tennessee.  It serves as a reminder that Tennessee abandoned the doctrine of lex loci delicti in Hataway v. McKinley, 820 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992) and adopted the "most significant relationship" approach when determining what substantive law applies when a conflict of law arises as described herein.  

The summary from the majority opinion states as follows:

This appeal concerns a conflict of law choice between Tennessee and Florida law.  James R. Sterchi, Jr. (“Mr. Sterchi”) sued L. Basil Savard (“Mr. Savard”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) for the wrongful death of Mr. Sterchi’s mother Rosalind Savard (“Mrs. Savard”) in a car accident in Florida.  Mr. Savard filed a motion for summary judgment. Florida law prevents Mr. Sterchi from pursuing his claim while Tennessee law does not.  All interested parties were domiciled in Tennessee.  The Trial Court held that Florida law applies and granted Mr. Savard’s motion for summary judgment.  Mr. Sterchi filed an appeal to this Court.  We hold that under “the most significant relationship” test as adopted by our Supreme Court in Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992), Tennessee has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties in this case, and, therefore, Tennessee substantive law applies to Mr. Sterchi’s wrongful death action. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

Here is a link to the majority opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/sterchijrjropn.pdf

Here is a link to Judge Frierson's concurring opinion (which deals with the applicability of Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 20-16-101):

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/sterchi_concurrence.pdf

Tenth Anniversary!

This post is a little belated, but, as of January of this year, this blog is ten years old!  

Doesn't seem like it's been a decade already.  Whew!

Thanks to all of you who read this blog and email me with questions, comments, etc. 

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to One Defendant Reversed on Appeal Due to the Application of the Discovery Rule

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Rogers v. Blount Mem'l Hosp., Inc., No. E2015-00136-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2016).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:

This appeal involves a health care liability action filed by the plaintiff against Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“BMHI”) and the doctor who treated the plaintiff at BMHI from September 8, 2012, to September 13, 2012. The plaintiff filed his complaint on December 13, 2013, alleging that the defendant doctor had misdiagnosed his illness, causing a delay in treatment and resultant permanent injuries. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were converted into motions for summary judgment with the filing of additional affidavits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BMHI based on, inter alia, the applicable statute of limitations and BMHI's immunity as a governmental entity. The court subsequently granted summary judgment to the defendant doctor based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff timely appealed. Determining that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding when the plaintiff was aware of facts sufficient to place him on notice that his injury was allegedly the result of the defendant doctor's wrongful conduct, we conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant doctor. We affirm the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of BMHI.

Here is a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/rogersj_022916.pdf

Just Swiney issued a separate concurring opinion also, which can be found at this link:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/SWINEYconcurring.pdf

NOTE: This opinion offers a good discussion of the discovery rule in health care liability actions.

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: The Common-knowledge Exception Is Alive and Well

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Osunde v. Delta Medical Center, No. W2015-01005-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:

This interlocutory appeal concerns the trial court‟s partial dismissal of a case concerning
alleged negligence committed against Plaintiff/Appellee Brenda Osunde (“Mrs. Osunde”).  Mrs. Osunde filed a complaint in the trial court alleging a medical malpractice claim against DMC-Memphis, Inc. (“DMC”), as well as a claim for common law negligence, after she sustained a fall while at DMC's hospital, Delta Medical Center. When Mrs. Osunde failed to disclose any experts pursuant to the trial court‟s scheduling order, DMC moved for summary judgment. In adjudicating DMC's motion, the trial court drew a distinction between Mrs. Osunde's “health care liability action,” which it dismissed for her failure to produce an expert, and Mrs. Osunde's common law negligence claim, which it ruled should proceed to trial. After ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court stayed further proceedings and granted DMC leave to pursue interlocutory review in this Court. Although we agree with DMC that all of Mrs. Osunde's asserted claims give rise to a “health care liability action” within the meaning of the Tennessee Code, we disagree with DMC's assertion that expert testimony is required to prove Mrs. Osundes allegations of negligence.  As such, we reverse the trial court‟s order to the extent that it purports to dismiss Mrs.Osunde's health care liability action, and we affirm the trial court‟s decision to allow this
case to proceed to trial.

Here's a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/brendaosundeetal_021116.pdf

NOTE: This opinion cites Deuel v. The Surgical Clinic, PLLC, No. M2009-01551-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3237297, at *9-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2010), available at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12032494268351347403&q=Deuel&hl=en&as_sdt=4,43 (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).  Deuel was my case and I am happy to see it being cited for the proposition that the common-knowledge exception to expert testimony is alive and well in Tennessee.  There is also persuasive authority that supports Deuel and Osunde from one of our sister states, New Jersey, to wit: Hubbard ex rel. Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495 (N.J. 2001), available at https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14138098579974599499&q=Hubbard&hl=en&as_sdt=4,31 (last visited Feb. 10, 2016).

Further, even if the common knowledge exception applies in a health care liability action, presuit notices must still be mailed out per Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121, even if a certificate of good faith is not required per Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-16-122.  See Hubbard, supra, and my post from March 10, 2015, to wit:

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2015/03/new-health-care-liability-action.html

New Medical Malpractice Opinion: Plaintiffs' Case Dismissed Due to Numerous Reasons

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Mikheil v. Nashville General Hospital at Meharry, No. No. M2014-02301-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2016).  The summary of the opinion states as follows:

In this health care liability action, the plaintiffs disagree with a number of the trial court’s rulings upon which it based its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court excluded the plaintiffs’ life care planner due to their failure to provide a complete disclosure of the life care planner’s opinions in a timely manner. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs’ sole standard of care expert, a neurosurgeon, was not competent to testify as to the standard of care of the defendant nurse practitioner.  Furthermore, the trial court precluded the plaintiffs’ standard of care expert from testifying at all due to the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the court’s orders regarding discovery. We find no abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decisions and affirm the judgment.

Here is a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/mikheilm_020116.pdf#page=1&zoom=auto,-99,798

NOTE: This case is still a "medical malpractice case" as opposed to a "health care liability action" because it arose before the statutory name change in 2011.

New Laws Effective in Tennessee on Jan. 1, 2016

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/01-01-2016_effective.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Dismissal of Representaitve Plaintiffs' Claims by Trial Court Upheld on Appeal Due to Their Failure to Provide HIPAA-complaint Authorization as Required by Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E)

The Tennessee Supreme Court just released its opinion in Dolman v. Donovan, No. W2015-00392-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).  Here is the summary from the opinion:

This is a healthcare liability action arising from the death of the decedent, Melinda Dolman.  Appellants, daughters of the decedent, filed this action against Appellees, Timothy Donovan, M.D., Brixey Shelton, M.D., Memphis Vascular Center, Memphis Radiological, P.C., and Memphis LeBonheur Healthcare. Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121.  Specifically, Appellees challenged whether the medical authorization provided with the presuit notice letter was compliant with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E).  Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court agreed with Appellees and dismissed the action. Appellants timely appealed. We affirm and remand.

Here is a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/melindadolman_122215.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Claim as Being Time-barred Upheld on Appeal; Plaintiff's Deceased Not "Adjuciated Incompetent" so as to Toll the Statute of Limitations

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Johnson v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, No. W2015-01022-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2015).  The summary from the opinion is as follows:

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action on behalf of her deceased husband. Plaintiff provided pre-suit notice more than one year after the cause of action accrued and subsequently filed a complaint. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued that her husband had been “adjudicated incompetent” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-106 and that the statute of limitations was accordingly tolled. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff‟s case with prejudice finding that the statute unambiguously required a judicial adjudication of incompetency in order to toll the statute of limitations, and Plaintiff‟s husband had not been judicially adjudicated incompetent within the meaning of the statute at the time the cause of action accrued. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/johnsonceoopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff's Expert Struck for Failing to Disclose Financial Documents; Case Dimissed by Trial Court

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Weatherspoon v. Minard, No. W2015-01099-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2015).  Here is the summary from the opinion:

Plaintiff filed this health care liability action against the defendant doctor in 2000 and voluntarily non-suited it in 2008. Plaintiff re-filed the action in 2009. The defendant moved to exclude the plaintiff‟s standard-of-care expert for his failure to produce certain financial documents. The trial court granted the motion and excluded the expert five days before the scheduled trial date. Plaintiff requested leave to employ another standard-of-care expert in the five days before trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff‟s entire case because, without a standard-of-care expert, he was unable to state a health care liability claim. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not permit him to “emergently arrange” for an expert in the five days preceding the scheduled trial date. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/weatherspoondopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Court of Appeals Upholds Trial Court's Dismissal Due to Failure to Comply with Presuit Notice Requirements

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Bray v. Khuri, No. W2015-00397-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2015).  The summary of the opinion states as follows:

This is a health care liability action arising from decedent’s death.  Appellant filed this action against Dr. Radwan Khuri. Dr. Khuri moved to dismiss this action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 et seq. Specifically, Dr. Khuri challenged whether the medical release provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). The trial court agreed with Dr. Khuri and dismissed the action with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. We affirm.

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/braydeborahopn.pdf

New Tennessee Supreme Court Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Hannan v. Alltel Overruled by the Court; Summary Judgment Granted to Defense on All Claims

Today, the Tennessee released its opinion in Rye v. Women's Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, No. W2013-00804-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 26, 2015).  Here is the summary from the opinion:

We granted permission to appeal in this healthcare liability action to reconsider the summary judgment standard adopted in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that the Hannan standard requires reversal of the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on certain of the plaintiffs‘ claims. We hereby overrule Hannan and return to a summary judgment standard consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We hold, therefore, that a moving party may satisfy its initial burden of production and shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party‘s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage to establish the nonmoving party‘s claim or defense. Applying our holding to the record in this case, we conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all the plaintiffs‘ claims at issue in this appeal. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary judgment on these issues and for any other proceedings that may be necessary.

Here is a link to the majority opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ryem.m.opn_.pdf

Justice Kirby did not participate in the decision.

Justice Lee authored a concurring opinion that can be found at this link:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ryem_con_lee.opn_.pdf

Justice Bivins  authored a concurring opinion also, which can be found at this link:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ryem_con_bivins.opn_.pdf

Justice Wade authored a dissenting opinion that can be found at this link:

 http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ryem_dis_wade.opn_.pdf

The Tennessee Supreme Court Rules That the Issue of Whether Caps on Noneconomic Damages Are Constitutional Is Not Ripe at This Time

The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the issue of whether caps on noneconomic damages are unconstitutional is not ripe at this time.  Clark v. Cain, No. E2015-00949-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2015) (per curiam), available at http://www2.tncourts.gov/PublicCaseHistory/CaseDetails.aspx?id=64104&Business=True (last visited Oct. 17, 2015).  (Please scroll down under the heading of "Case History" to view the order.)

With this order, the Court accepted the defendants' and the State's applications for permission to appeal, ruled that this issue was not ripe at this time, vacated the trial court's ruling that caps were unconstitutional, and remanded the matter back to the trial court.  (Id.)

As much as I would have liked to have seen this issue decided now, this appears to the correct decision by the Court.  However, the plaintiffs had to challenge the caps preverdict because it had been decided by at least one other state's high court that a plaintiff was precluding from challenging that state’s caps postverdict and should have done so preverdict. 

NOTE: Thanks to Jon Peeler of Nashville, Tenn. for bringing this to my attention last night.

P.S.  Here is what I think about tort "reform," which caps on noneconomic damages are a part of.  Watch the clip below: pay attention to it at about the one-minute mark, to wit:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NXvcleOF798

New Tennessee Supreme Court Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court's Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Lawsuit Due to Their Failure to Provide the Statutorily Required Presuit Notice and File a Certificate of Good Faith Reinstated by the Court

The Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion today in Ellithorpe v. Weismark, No. M2014-00279-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2015).  The summary of the opinion states as follows:

We granted review in this health care liability action to decide whether the trial court erred by failing to apply this Court's analysis in Estate of French v. Stratford House, 333 S.W.3d 546 (Tenn. 2011), in determining whether it was necessary for plaintiffs to provide pre-suit notice and a certificate of good faith under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-101 et seq. We hold that the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011, which amended the THCLA, statutorily abrogated our decision in Estate of French by providing that “[a]ny such civil action or claim is subject to [the THCLA] regardless of any other claims, causes of action, or theories of liability alleged in the complaint.” Because it is undisputed that the plaintiffs in this case failed to provide pre-suit notice or file a certificate of good faith, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs‟ complaint with prejudice is reinstated.

(Alterations in original.)

Here's a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ellithorpea_opn.pdf

NOTE: This case eviscerates the holding in French, supra, and disallows claims for ordinary negligence against providers listed in Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-16-101.  It does, however, acknowledge that the common knowledge exception to expert testimony remains extant.