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This case involves the application of the statute of limitations to an intervening personal injury complaint filed by a bankruptcy trustee after the defendants asserted that the original plaintiff, the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding, lacked standing to bring the claim. Once the bankruptcy trustee became aware of the claim, he filed a motion for intervention, or in the alternative, for substitution pursuant to Rule 17.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted the trustee’s motion and the trustee later filed an intervening complaint. The trial court, however, later dismissed the case, reasoning that because the first complaint was filed by a party without standing, the original complaint was a nullity. Under this theory, the trial court concluded that the action was commenced upon the filing of the trustee’s intervening complaint, which was undisputedly outside the applicable statute of limitations. Having determined that the plaintiff’s original complaint was not a nullity, we conclude that the trustee’s intervening complaint relates back to the original complaint and, thus, was filed within the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
A husband and wife filed a claim against a county hospital alleging that the negligence of the hospital and its employees caused the death of their son. The claim was filed approximately fifteen months after their son’s death in accordance with the provisions of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012). The county hospital, a governmental entity, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the claim was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”). Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). The couple responded that their complaint was timely filed because Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) extended the GTLA statute of limitations by 120 days. The trial court denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals granted the Rule 9 application and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the hospital’s motion to dismiss. We granted the hospital permission to appeal. We hold that the 120-day extension provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not apply to the plaintiffs’ claim brought under the GTLA. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court denying the hospital’s motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for entry of an order dismissing Mr. and Mrs. Cunningham’s complaint.Here's a link to the opinion:
This case presents the issue of whether proper service of process was accomplished regarding the defendant, Saeed Etezadi, M.D. Plaintiff, Will J. Milton, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Etezadi on April 14, 2003. The complaint and summons were served upon Dr. Etezadi’s office manager, with a notation appearing on the summons that service was accepted as “agent.” Dr. Etezadi filed an answer which, inter alia, raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Mr. Milton voluntarily dismissed that action and subsequently re-filed within one year of the non-suit. In connection with the second action, the complaint and summons were allegedly served upon Dr. Etezadi at his office. Dr. Etezadi filed an Answer, again raising the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process. Dr. Etezadi also asserted that all applicable statutes of limitation and repose had expired. He later filed a motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the trial court dismissed the claims against Dr. Etezadi, finding that there was no service of process in either action. Mr. Milton appeals. We affirm.
This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to T.C.A. § 29-26-121, which requires notice to defendants prior to the commencement of a health care liability lawsuit. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit asserting health care liability against the defendant health care providers within the applicable statute of limitations, but without providing the defendants with prior notice as required under Section 29-26-121. In ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court held that Section 29-26-121 conflicted with Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. On this basis, it held that the statute infringed upon the authority of the judicial branch to enact rules governing the procedures for commencing a lawsuit, and thus violated the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution. the defendant health care providers were granted permission for this interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse, holding that pre-lawsuit notice requirement in Section 29-26-121 does not contravene the separation of powers clause of the Tennessee Constitution.
In this interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a medical malpractice claimant to provide certain notice sixty days prior to filing suit. We conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121 is not an unconstitutional infringement upon the courts’ rule-making authority, that it is not preempted by HIPAA, and that it does not violate the equal protection and due process provisions of state and federal law. Affirmed and Remanded.
This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v.Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded.
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against numerous healthcare providers. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
The issue presented is whether the jury verdict against the management company of an assisted living facility for negligence based on understaffing is supported by material evidence. Mable Farrar’s physician prescribed Ms. Farrar a dailydose of an over-the-counter medicine for constipation. The nursing staff at the assisted living facility where Ms. Farrar lived did not give the medicine to her as often as prescribed. As a result, Ms. Farrar became constipated and returned to see her doctor. Ms. Farrar’s doctor notified the nursing staff at the assisted living facilityto give Ms. Farrar three to four enemas each day beginning on May 27, 2004. A facility nurse gave Ms. Farrar one enema on the evening of May 27, none on May 28, and one enema on the evening of May 29. Very soon after receiving the last enema on May 29, Ms. Farrar died from a perforated colon. Her daughters filed a wrongful death action against the nurse who gave the enema, the director of nursing at the assisted living facility, the owner of the facility, and its management company. The suit alleged that the negligence of the staff, the owner, and its management company caused Ms. Farrar’s death. The jury returned a verdict finding the nurse thirty percent at fault, the director of nursing twenty percent at fault, and the management company fifty percent at fault based on its failure to provide sufficient personnel at the facility. The management company appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict against the management company, finding that there was no material evidence that staffing deficiencies proximately caused Ms.Farrar’s death. We hold that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the award of punitive damages.
Here is a link to the opinion, to wit:Plaintiff filed suit against Vanderbilt University Medical Center for injuries she sustained during an MRI scan. The trial court held that the complaint stated a claim for medical malpractice and dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“TMMA”). Plaintiff appeals, asserting the complaint sounded in common law negligence and, alternatively, that the documents she filed complied with the TMMA. We affirm the trial court
This interlocutory appeal involves comparative fault and amending to add a defendant. The plaintiff suffered slip-and-fall injuries at the defendant airport. The day before the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the airport, alleging negligence. The airport’s answer asserted comparative fault but did not identify an additional tortfeasor. In later discovery, the airport identified its janitorial service. The plaintiff amended her complaint to add the janitorial service as a defendant, citing T.C.A.§ 20-1-119. The defendant janitorial service filed a motion to dismiss, citing the statute of limitations. The trial court declined to dismiss the claims against the janitorial service, holding that the disclosure of the identity of the janitorial service in discovery triggered the 90-day statutory period under Section 20-1-119 in which the plaintiff is permitted to amend the complaint to add a defendant. We reverse, holding that, by the express terms of Section 20-1-119, the statutory 90-day period is not triggered by a defendant’s response to a discovery request.
A woman who suffered a series of persistent infections after surgery filed a malpractice complaint against the defendant surgeon. Her complaint alleged that the infections were cause by a small metal object that the defendant had negligently left in her body during the surgery. The plaintiff attached to her complaint the statutorily required certificate of good faith, which certified that she had consulted with an expert, who provided a signed statement confirming that he believed, on the basis of the medical records, that there was a good faith basis to maintain the action. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. After the object was discovered to be a surgical clip of a type that was designed to be retained by the patient’s body, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The defendant surgeon subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (d)(3), which gives the court the authority to punish violations related to the certificate of good faith. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded the defendant doctor over $22,000 in attorney fees. We reverse.
In this action the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds the statute of limitation had run on plaintiff's cause of action. The Trial Court overruled the Motion on the grounds that the tolling provisions in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(c) was applicable to GTLA actions and granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. On appeal, we hold that the tolling provision does not apply because the statute did not expressly extend it to GTLA actions.
Does the medical malpractice pre-suit notice requirement contained in Tennessee Code Annotated §29-26-121(a) operate to toll the one year statute of limitations for bringing suit against a governmental entity under the GTLA?
This appeal involves an attempt to substitute parties after the original plaintiff in this wrongful death case died. The trial court struck the motion to substitute parties and dismissed the case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.Here's a link to the opinion:
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against several health care providers and subsequently dismissed the lawsuit. He re-filed the action after the legislature enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit to give health care providers who are to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, which requires a plaintiff to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff’s original suit constituted substantial compliance with the statutes’ requirements and that extraordinary cause existed to excuse compliance with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. Upon interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the statutory requirements that a plaintiff give sixty days presuit notice and file a certificate of good faith with the complaint are mandatory requirements and not subject to substantial compliance. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122 by filing a certificate of good faith with his complaint requires a dismissal with prejudice.
In this action, the plaintiff has attempted to assert claims for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against nursing home defendants by filing two separate actions and then seeking to consolidate the cases or to amend the complaint to assert both types of claims in one case. The first complaint filed only asserted claims for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants. Sixty days after having given the statutory notice to the healthcare providers of her intent to file medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the same nursing home defendants and an additional defendant, a physician who treated the nursing home patient, by filing a complaint for medical malpractice. Upon motions of the nursing home defendants, the trial court refused to consolidate the cases, dismissed the medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants upon the ground of a prior suit pending, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in the first case to add claims for medical malpractice against the nursing home defendants. Having determined that the plaintiff complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(a) by giving the requisite 60 days notice to the medical providers and that the statute of limitations had not run, we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants thus allowing the plaintiff to assert medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.Here's a link to the opinion:
The widow of a man who suffered a devastating injury while undergoing a medical procedure in the defendant hospital filed suit against the hospital and the doctor who ordered the procedure, claiming medical malpractice, failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and the defendant doctor filed a motion to dismiss, both arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claims had to be dismissed because she failed to strictly comply with requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (a)(1) (60-day notice) and §29-26-122(a) (certificate of good faith). The trial court granted both motions in part and denied them in part. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against both defendants as well as the related claims. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the defendant doctor for failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent, but we affirm its dismissal of the medical battery claim against the defendant doctor.Here's a link to the majority opinion:
Here's a link to the opinion:Plaintiffs filed a voluntary notice of nonsuit in this medical malpractice action in July 2009. They refiled their claim in September 2010. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
In this case, the Trial Court initially granted plaintiff a default judgment against the defendant, and set a trial on the issue of damages. Defendant was given notice of the subsequent hearing, and defendant's attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed plaintiff's case. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.Here is a link to the opinion:
Here's a link to the opinion:Plaintiffs charged defendant with medical malpractice. The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant. An out-of-state medical doctor testified on behalf of the defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court, insisting that it was reversible error for the Trial Court to allow that expert to testify in violation of the "Locality Rule". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.
The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this medical malpractice action where Plaintiff failed to attach a HIPPA compliant medical authorization to her notice to Defendants prior to filing her complaint as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.
We accepted this appeal of a personal injury action to determine whether the dismissal of a defendant pursuant to a written order not made final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 renders that defendant “not a party to the suit” for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119. We answer this question in the affirmative. Because the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appellees from the Manns’ second amended complaint as time-barred, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
This case concerns the application of the medical malpractice notice requirement to a lawsuit that was previously nonsuited and then re-filed pursuant to the saving statute. The children of a woman who died due to alleged medical negligence filed suit against the defendant medical providers. The children subsequently nonsuited the lawsuit. Within one-year of the nonsuit, the children sent notice of a potential claim to the medical providers. Within one year and 120 days from the nonsuit, the children re-filed their claim. The medical providers moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was not filed within the one-year period provided by the saving statute and, as such, was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court dismissed the action and the children appealed. Concluding that the saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-1-105(a) is not an “applicable statute[] of limitations or repose,” we hold that the saving statute is not extended by compliance with the medical malpractice notice requirement, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c). Affirmed and remanded.Here's a link to the opinion:
Zona Mayo (“Plaintiff”) sued Donna L. Shine, M.D., Fort Sanders Obstetrical and Gynecological Group, P.C., and Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center (“the Hospital”) alleging medical malpractice in connection with Plaintiff’s birth. After a jury trial, the Trial Court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict finding and holding that neither Dr. Shine nor the Hospital were legally responsible for any harm suffered by Plaintiff. Plaintiff appeals raising issues regarding alleged jury misconduct and alleged errors with regard to admission of evidence, among other things. We find and hold that Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial due to errors in the admission of specific evidence and the improper limitation of Plaintiff’s cross-examination of Dr. Shine, among other things. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand this case to the Trial Court for a new trial in compliance with this Opinion.
A patient who alleged that he had been negligently injured by his podiatrist filed a complaint against him for malpractice, and then voluntary dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Less than a year later, he furnished the defendant podiatrist with the sixty day notice of potential claim required by a recently enacted statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a). He subsequently refiled his complaint in reliance on his rights under the saving statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint was time-barred under the saving statute because it was filed more than one year after the dismissal of the original complaint. The plaintiff contended, however, that he was entitled to the benefit of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c), which extends the statute of limitations on medical malpractice claims by 120 days if the plaintiff has complied with the sixty day notice requirement. The defendant responded by arguing that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does not apply to complaints filed under the saving statute. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, but allowed him to file an application for interlocutory appeal because of the novelty of the legal question involved. After careful consideration of the relevant statutes, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c) does apply to the saving statute, and we affirm.
The Trial Court dismissed this case based upon its finding that although plaintiff’s Summons was issued the day she filed her Complaint, proof of service was not made to the clerk until 412 days later, and, because plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 3 to toll the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Here's a link to the opinion:This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. A surgeon performed a procedure on an infant to repair a birth defect at the defendant hospital. The infant sustained permanent injuries after the surgery. The parents filed suit on the infant’s behalf against the hospital for failing to adhere to the expected standard of care. At the conclusion of trial, the hospital moved for a directed verdict on all claims, with only the claims for informed consent and post-operative negligence being denied. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the infant. The hospital has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
This appeal arises from the dismissal of a medical malpractice action due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide a certificate of good faith. All defendants filed Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss the medical malpractice action based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-122(a), which provides: “If the certificate is not filed with the complaint, the complaint shall be dismissed, as provided in subsection (c), absent a showing that the failure was due to the failure of the provider to timely provide copies of the claimant’s records requested as provided in § 29-26-121 or demonstrated extraordinary cause.” Because the plaintiff failed to make a showing that the omission was due to the failure of any healthcare provider to provide records or demonstrate extraordinary cause, the trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The plaintiff asserts on appeal that the statutory requirement violates the separation of powers clause and that it violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the constitution of Tennessee by treating plaintiffs in suits for medical negligence differently from plaintiffs in other civil litigation and by allegedly restricting access to the courts. Finding no constitutional infirmities, we affirm.Here's a link to the opinion:
How is an "injury" defined for purposes of medical malpractice? Here is the definition, to wit:
An injury is defined as any want of skillful care or diligence on a physician's part that sets back a patient's recovery, prolongs the patient's illness, increases the plaintiff's suffering, or, in short, makes the patient's condition worse than if due skill, care, and diligence had been used.Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 171 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (defining injury for purposes of medical malpractice actions).
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Kennard v. Townsend, No. W2010–00461–COA–R3C, 2011 WL 1434625 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 14, 2011), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). In our previous review of this medical malpractice case, we upheld the trial court’s exclusion of Appellant’s medical expert under the locality rule, and further affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against the Appellant. Because the qualifications of Appellant’s expert were not considered in light of Shipley, and because the admission of expert testimony is a matter of discretion in the trial court, we vacate the orders excluding the testimony of the Appellant’s expert and the grant of summary judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of the Shipley decision. Vacated and remanded.
We accepted this appeal to determine whether the phrase “a defendant named . . . within the applicable statute of limitations” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119(a) (2009) refers only to a defendant sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim or also refers to defendants not sued within the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s claim, but added to the lawsuit during the ninety-day period provided by section 20-1-119(a). Whether section 20-1-119(a) affords successive ninety-day windows during which a plaintiff may amend a complaint to add a new nonparty defendant as a comparative tortfeasor is an issue of first impression. Because we answer that question in the negative, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court granting Fulmarque’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing this action.Here's a link to the majority opinion:
This is a medical malpractice appeal. The plaintiff patient was treated by the defendant physician for ear problems. After the treatment, she had a complete loss of hearing in one ear. The plaintiff patient filed this lawsuit against the physician, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. After potential experts in Tennessee and contiguous states declined to testify against the defendant physician, the trial court permitted the plaintiff to use an expert physician witness from a non-contiguous state. At the jury trial, after the jury was sworn and counsel gave opening statements, a juror notified the trial judge of the her concern about an upcoming social event she planned to attend, at which a relative of the defendant physician would be present. After voir dire, the trial judge noted that the plaintiff patient had unused remaining peremptory challenges and excused the juror. The trial court denied the defendant physician’s motion for directed verdict on informed consent. the jury awarded the plaintiff substantial compensatory damages. The defendant physician now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff to obtain an expert from a non-contiguous state, in allowing the plaintiff to exercise a peremptory challenge after trial was underway, in permitting the informed consent claim to go to the jury, and in denying the defendants’ motion to exclude the expert retained by the plaintiff. We affirm on all issues except the dismissal of the juror. We hold it would be error to permit the exercise of a peremptory challenge after the trial is underway, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. Therefore, we affirm.
Here's a link to the majority opinion:
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/mcdonaldmopn.pdf
Here's a link to Judge Highers's separate concurring and dissenting opinion:
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/mcdonaldcon.pdf
This appeal arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained after undergoing laser corrective eye surgery. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging medical negligence. Subsequently, Defendant filed an amended answer alleging, inter alia, the affirmative defense of comparative fault. Plaintiff filed a motion to atrike portions of Defendant’s amended answer, and following a hearing on the motion, Defendant agreed to the entry of a consent order waiving the defense of comparative fault. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed motions in limine to preclude the testimony of two of Defendant’s experts. Plaintiff argued that, because Defendant waived comparative fault, he could not use the causation testimony of the two experts to shift blame away from himself unless he first plead comparative fault under Rule 8.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied both motions. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.Here's a link to the opinion: