SCOTN Rejects "Preemption Rule" That Would Prohibit Direct Negligent Claims Against a Principal When Vicarious Liability as to an Agent Has Been Admitted by Principal; SCOTN Also Holds That Claims for Negligent Activities May Be Pleaded in the Same Action Along with Premises Liability Claims

The Tennessee Supreme Court has released its opinion in Binns v. Trader Joe's East, Inc., No. M2022-01033-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Apr. 8, 2024). The syllabus form the slip opinion reads: 

This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Here is a link to that opinion: 

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2022-01033-SC-R11-CV.pdf

NOTE: This is a must-read case for any lawyer who handles tort cases governed by Tennessee substantive law that have to do with agency and premises liability. 

New SCOTN Case: Trial Court's Decision Denying Arbitration in a Nursing Home Case Reversed on Appeal Because the Attorney-in-Fact Was Authorized to Sign Arbitration Agreement

The Tennessee Supreme Court has released its opinion in Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC, No. M2021-00927-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Feb. 16, 2024). The syllabus from the majority opinion reads: 

Granville Williams, Jr., died while residing at an assisted-living facility. The central question in this appeal is whether his son’s ensuing wrongful-death action against the facility must be arbitrated. To answer that question, we must resolve two subsidiary issues—first, whether the attorney-in-fact who signed the arbitration agreement as Williams’s representative had authority to do so and, second, whether Williams’s son and other wrongful-death beneficiaries who were not parties to the arbitration agreement nevertheless are bound by it. We hold that signing an optional arbitration agreement—that is, one that is not a condition of admission to a health care facility—is not a “health care decision” within the meaning of the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. The durable power of attorney that gave Williams’s attorney-in-fact authority to act for him in “all claims and litigation matters” thus provided authority to enter the optional arbitration agreement even though it did not specifically grant authority to make health care decisions. We further hold that Williams’s son is bound by the arbitration agreement because his wrongful-death claims are derivative of his father’s claims. Because we conclude that the claims in this action are subject to arbitration, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand to the trial court.

Here is a link to that opinion: 

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2021-00927-SC-R11-CV.pdf.

Here is a link to Justice Lee's dissent:

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Separate%20Opinion-%20M2021-00927-SC-R11-CV.pdf.

Here is Chief Justice Kirby's opinion joining Justice Lee's dissent:

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Separate%20Opinion%20%282%29%20-M2021-00927-SC-R11-CV.pdf.

NOTE: This opinion reverses the one from the Tennessee Court of Appeals in this same case that was released on April 8, 2022, which is the subject of my blog post from April 9, 2022, to wit:

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2022/04/trial-courts-denial-of-defendants.html.