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Tuesday, November 04, 2014

Offer of Judgment Made under Tenn. R. Civ . P. 68 Held to Be Irrevocable During Ten-day Period

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion Friday in McGinnis ex rel. McGinnis v. Cox, No. M2014-00102-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Plaintiffs presented Defendants with an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to Defendants’ acceptance, Plaintiffs attempted to rescind the offer. Defendants nevertheless accepted the offer within the time allowed by Rule 68 and attempted to enforce the offer of judgment. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were not entitled to revoke the offer of judgment and entered an order granting the motion to enforce the judgment. We affirm and remand.
Here is a link to the slip opinion:


NOTE: the ten-day life of an offer of judgment can be extended via Rule 6 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  This is all the more reason that one must be very careful before making an offer of judgment under Rule 68.

Monday, November 03, 2014

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: 120-day Extension to Statute of Limitations Applies to Governmental Entities

The Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion last week in Harper v. Bradley Cnty., No. E2014-00107-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
The issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff who brings a health care liability action against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) is entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c)(Supp. 2014) under the current version of the Health Care Liability Act (“the HCLA”). This inquiry focuses on the effect of the 2011 amendment to the HCLA that expressly includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof” within the definition of “health care liability action.” Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), we hold that the 2011 amendment demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations to be extended by 120 days in cases where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the HCLA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant Bradley County’s motion to dismiss.
(Emphasis and italics in original.)

Here is a link to the opinion:


NOTE: This post should be read with my May 9, 2013 post discussing the Cunningham case cited in the summary above (with its footnotes foreshadowing this decision).  Here is a link to that post: 


Further, this is a must-read opinion for any lawyer who handles health care liability cases (f.k.a. medical malpractice cases).  If this case is taken up by the Tennessee Supreme Court, which is very likely, the Court will more than likely affirm the trial court as the lower appellate court did.  It is the correct decision in my humble opinion.

Lastly, it would be a safe assumption for one to think that the three-year statute of repose would be extended by 120 days via the 2011 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-101, too. Compare Harper, supra, with T.C.A. § 29-26-121(c).  However, I am not aware of any case holding that way at this time.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Health Care Liability Action Dismissed via Summary Judgment

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion today in Buman v. Gibson, No. W2013-01867-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action involving a physician’s duties when supervising a physician’s assistant. The plaintiff alleged the supervising physician negligently supervised a physician’s assistant which resulted in the eventual amputation of the plaintiff’s leg. The physician moved for summary judgment, contending that he complied with all statutory duties. The plaintiff responded to this motion and simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to allege that the physician was vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the physician’s assistant. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint and granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Here's a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/bumanm_081114.pdf

Sunday, August 03, 2014

New Tennessee Court of Appeals Opinion on Voir Dire, Remittitur, and Damages

The Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., No. W2013-01949-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2014).  The summary from the majority opinion states as follows:
Plaintiff was injured in an accident involving three tractor-trailer trucks. Plaintiff, who was driving a tractor-trailer, sued the other truck drivers and the trucking company owners of the vehicles. However, prior to trial, Plaintiff entered into an agreement with one of the trucking companies whereby Plaintiff and the agreeing defendant agreed to cooperate regarding the litigation and to work together to expose the defenses asserted by the non-agreeing defendant. The jury returned an itemized verdict of $3,705,000 for the Plaintiff against the non-agreeing defendant. The trial court denied the non-agreeing defendant’s motion for a new trial, but it suggested a remittitur of $1,605,000, for a total award of $2,100,000.  Plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest and the non-agreeing defendant appealed to this Court. For the following reasons, we affirm in part and we reverse in part. Specifically, we affirm the physical pain and mental anguish and permanent injury awards as reduced by the trial court; we reverse the trial court’s suggested remittitur of the loss of earning capacity award and we instead reinstate the jury verdict of $1,455,000; and we further reduce the loss of enjoyment of life award to $50,000. Thus, we approve a total award to Plaintiff of $2,105,000.
Here's a link to the majority opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/borned_073114.pdf

Here's a link to the partial dissent by Judge Stafford:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/bornd_DIS_073114.pdf

NOTE: look for a Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application to be filed in this case.  I suspect the Tennessee Supreme Court might take it up given the very good points Judge Stafford made in his partial dissent.


Friday, August 01, 2014

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion

Yesterday the Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion in Johnson v. Parkwest Med. Ctr., No. E2013-01228-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Eric Johnson, acting individually and as next of kin of the decedent,Jana Lanell Johnson, and the Estate of Jana Lanelle Johnson (“Plaintiffs”), filed the instant action on April 27, 2010, regarding Ms. Johnson’s death. The action alleged health care liability claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-115, as well as other claims, including ordinary negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. An agreed order granting partial summary judgment to Parkwest Medical Center (“Parkwest”) was entered with regard toPlaintiffs’ non-medical claims. Parkwest subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Plaintiffs failed to comply with all of the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 regarding the health care liability claim. Upon hearing, the trial court granted the motion. Plaintiffs filed additional motions regarding newly discovered evidence, including a motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, a motion to amend the certificate of good faith, and a motion seeking sanctions. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion seeking to set aside the prior order granting partial summary judgment or to amend the complaint, as well as Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the certificate of good faith. The trial court failed to rule on Plaintiffs’ motion seeking sanctions. Plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ health care liability claim based on Plaintiffs’ failure to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121. We vacate the trial court’s rulings with regard to Plaintiffs’ motions to amend and motion to set aside the partial summary judgment order. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Here is a link to the opinion:


Monday, July 28, 2014

Case Dismissed Due to Plaintiff's Counsel's Failure to Effect Proper Service of Process

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Doyle v. Town of Oakland, No. W2013-02078-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 28, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is an appeal from a dismissal for improper service of process. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant municipality. The summons and complaint were served on the municipality’s finance director. In its answer, the municipality asserted improper service of process for failure to serve either the municipality’s chief executive or its city attorney.  Later, the municipality filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion asserted that, because service of process was insufficient under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.04, the complaint was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the municipality. The plaintiff appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/doylelopn.pdf

Thursday, July 24, 2014

New Medical Malpractice Case: Expert's Failure to Disclose Financial Information Leads to Disqualification

The Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Lasseter v. Estate of Fernando Herrera, M.D., No. W2013-02105-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 24, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This appeal involves a defendant’s attempts to discover certain financial information from the plaintiff’s medical expert in order to facilitate an inquiry into potential bias. The trial court entered several orders requiring the expert witness to provide the requested financial information, which related to his income and compensation, but the expert witness repeatedly failed to comply with the trial court’s orders. The trial court also ruled that the defendant would be permitted to question the expert witness about certain financial information during cross-examination at trial, and the expert witness communicated to the trial judge that he would refuse to answer any such questions. The trial court eventually excluded the medical expert as a witness and allowed the plaintiff time to find a replacement expert. When the plaintiff failed to identify another expert witness within the time allowed, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Here's a link to the opinion:

Saturday, July 19, 2014

New Health Care Liability Opinion on Ex Parte Communications with a Plaintiff's Treating Physicians

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Hall v. Crenshaw, No. W2013-00662-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 18, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This interlocutory appeal involves ex parte communications between defense counsel for a defendant medical entity and non-party physicians who treated the plaintiff’s decedent and are employed by the defendant medical entity. The plaintiff filed this healthcare liability action against the defendant medical entity arising out of treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent. The trial court held that the attorneys for the defendant medical entity are barred under Alsip v. Johnson City Medical Center, 197 S.W.3d 722 (Tenn. 2006), from conferring ex parte with treating physicians employed by the defendant medical entity who are not named as defendants in the lawsuit. The defendant medical entity was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We hold that the defendant medical entity has an independent right to communicate privately with its employees, and this right is not abrogated by the filing of the plaintiff’s healthcare liability lawsuit. Therefore, Alsip does not bar the medical entity’s attorneys from communicating ex parte with physicians employed by the medical entity about the physician employee’s medical treatment of the plaintiff’s decedent.  Accordingly, we reverse. 
(Bolding and italics in original.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/hallcopn_0.pdf

Tuesday, July 15, 2014

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on Summary Judgments: Trial Courts Must Explain Reasoning When Ruling on Summary Judgment Motions and Can't Delegate that Function to Counsel

The Tennessee Supreme Court just issued its opinion in Smith v. UHS Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Jul. 15, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This appeal involves the manner in which a trial court granted motions for summary judgment in a proceeding involving the death of a patient whose treatment for viral encephalitis was delayed because he was also being assessed for involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital. The widow of the deceased patient filed suit against three health care providers in the Circuit Court for Shelby County. In her original complaint and four subsequent amended complaints, the widow asserted eight causes of action against one or more of the providers. The trial court eventually granted a series of summary judgments dismissing all the claims against one of the providers without explaining the grounds for its decisions and requested counsel for the provider to prepare appropriate orders “establish[ing] the rationale for the [c]ourt’s ruling in quite specific detail.” The provider’s counsel prepared detailed orders adopting all the arguments the provider had made in favor of its summary judgment motions, and the trial court signed these orders over the widow’s objections. The widow appealed, arguing that the trial court had failed to provide reasons for its decisions and that the orders did not accurately reflect what had occurred at the summary judgment hearings. The Court of Appeals vacated the disputed orders because the trial court had failed to state the legal grounds for its decisions as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 and remanded the case to the trial court. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., No. W2011-02405-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 210250, at *12-13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2013). We granted the provider’s application for permission to appeal. We have determined that the record establishes that the contested orders were not the product of the trial court’s independent judgment, and therefore, we hold that the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.
Here is a link to the slip opinion:


Friday, July 11, 2014

New Medical Malpractice Case (n.k.a. Health Care Liability Action): Plaintiff's Claim Against Additional Defendants Held to Be Time-barred

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Robinson v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, No. W2013-01198-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 11, 2014).  Here is the summary from the opinion:
This is a medical negligence/wrongful death case. Following their mother’s death, Appellants’ filed the instant lawsuit against several doctors who provided treatment to their mother. During discovery, Appellants allegedly learned that the Appellee physician had amended his original consultation report to correct a mis-diagnosis of the Decedent’s condition. Appellants were granted leave to amend their complaint to add the Appellee and his medical practice as defendants to the lawsuit. The amended complaint naming the Appellees was filed some five years after the filing of the original lawsuit. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statutes of limitations and repose barred Appellants’ case. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the Appellants had not shown facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment on the part of the Appellee physician so as to toll the applicable one-year statute of limitations and three-year statute of repose under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-116. The trial court also found that Appellants had failed to exercise due diligence in discovering the alleged fraudulent concealment. Appellants appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm and remand.
Here is a link to the slip opinion:


Note: This case was decided under the old law in Tennessee before cases were referred to by statute as "health care liability actions."  This does not, however, appear to affect the holding of this case.

Wednesday, July 09, 2014

New Medical Malpractice Case (n.k.a. Health Care Liability Action): Plaintiff Allowed to Nonsuit Case to Cure Allegedly Defective Certificate of Good Faith

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Davis v. Ibach, No. W2013-02514-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a medical malpractice wrongful death action. After the plaintiff filed this lawsuit, he timely filed a certificate of good faith, as required by the medical malpractice statute. The certificate did not include a statement that the executing party had “zero” violations of the statute. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on this omission. The plaintiff in turn filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit without prejudice. The defendants objected to a dismissal without prejudice. The defendants argued that, if the certificate of good faith does not strictly comply with the statutes, the trial court must dismiss the case with prejudice. The trial court granted the voluntary nonsuit without prejudice, and the defendants now appeal that decision.
Discerning no error, we affirm.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/davistopn_0.pdf

Note: this opinion deals with some law that is no longer in effect.  However, that does not appear to affect the holding of this case.

Tuesday, July 08, 2014

Another Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Plaintiff's Case Dismissed Due to Running of Statute of Limitations That Was Not Extended by Presuit Notice That Was Transmitted in a Manner Proscribed by Statute

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Arden v. Kozawa, No. E2013-01598-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 18, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
The plaintiff, as surviving spouse, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his health care liability action against the defendant doctor who treated the plaintiff’s wife prior to her death and the hospital wherein the treatment occurred. The trial court granted the defendants’motions for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013). We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff had to strictly comply with the provisions of the notice requirement and conclude that the plaintiff substantially complied with said requirement. We affirm, however, the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiff could not rely upon the statutory 120-day extension of the statute of limitations due to his failure to properly serve the notice. We therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims as barred by the statute of limitations.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/ardenopnfinal.pdf

Wednesday, July 02, 2014

The Declaration of Independence

Every Independence Day ("Fourth of July"), or around that time, I post this video on my blog.  Here it is again: 


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYyttEu_NLU

Happy Independence Day everyone!

Monday, June 30, 2014

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Trial Court Erred in Excluding One of Plaintiff's Expert Witnesses; Error, However, Was Harmless under the Circumstances

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Evans v. Williams, No. W2013-02051-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 30, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action appeal.[]  The case was tried before a jury, resulting in a judgment for the defendant physicians. The trial court excluded the testimony of one of the plaintiff’s expert witnesses on the applicable standard of care after finding that he was not qualified under the locality rule. The plaintiff appealed to this Court arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in its application of the locality rule. We hold that it was error for the trial court to exclude the witness, but find that any error was harmless under the facts of this case. We therefore affirm.
(Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

Thursday, June 26, 2014

New Laws Effective in Tennessee in 2014

January 1, 2014:

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/effective%2001-01-2014.pdf

July 1, 2014:

http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/publications/Effective%207-1-2014.pdf


New Health Care Liability Opinion: Court Holds Plaintiffs Failed to Comply with the Onerous Presuit Notice Requirements; Lawsuit Dimisssed

The Tennessee Court of Appeals from the Eastern Section just released its opinion in Roberts v. Prill, No. E2013-02202-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jun. 26, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability[] action arising from the death of Decedent. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal to this court. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal. 
Here is a link to the opinion:

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

New "Premises Liability" Case: Directed Verdict for the Defense Reversed on Appeal; Court Reminds Us That Causation and Fault Are Generally Questions for the Jury

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Wilson v. TMBC, LLC,  No. 2013-01907-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
The plaintiff took his bass fishing boat to defendant’s business for it to repair a “rodbox lid” that did not fit properly. While the boat was there, defendant replaced the lid. Subsequently, plaintiff went to the defendant’s store and got in the boat, which was on a trailer in the parking lot, in order to examine the new lid. While attempting to exit the boat, plaintiff caught his foot on something, tripped, and fell out of the boat. Plaintiff’s theory was that an employee of the defendant had negligently left the old rodbox lid inside the boat and that plaintiff tripped over the old lid. At the close of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that (1) plaintiff failed to prove breach of duty because, according to defendant, he offered no evidence of the object that caused his fall; and (2) defendant could not, as a matter of law, be liable because plaintiff was at least 50% at fault for his injuries. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant. We hold that plaintiff presented sufficient proof that the old lid caused him to trip and fall, and that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the employee had negligently caused plaintiff’s injury. We further hold that the question of comparative fault is properly for the jury to decide under the proof presented at this trial. We therefore vacate the directed verdict and remand for further proceedings. 
Here is a link to the opinion:


NOTE: in this case, at trial, a directed verdict was granted to the defense.  The Court of Appeals does a good job analyzing the law on this subject, and, again, reminds us that causation and fault are generally questions for the jury.

Friday, May 23, 2014

Memorial Day 2014

Please have a safe holiday weekend.  And remember our fallen soldiers.  They paid the ultimate sacrifice for you, me, and our posterity.

Thursday, May 15, 2014

Help Keep the Tennessee Supreme Court Fair and Impartial: Vote to "RETAIN" Justices Clark, Lee, and Wade on Aug. 7, 2014

Members of the Tennessee Supreme Court are under attack by our state's Lt. Gov.  The attack is unfair, unwarranted, and just flat-out wrong.  See the news story at the following link below:


Further, the Lt. Gov. appears to be leading this attack for no other reason than his own political gain (think about it, he "wins" this one, he then gains favor from interests such as Big Money and Big Business, etc., which will help him run for governor---again!).

As such, if you are a registered voter in Tennessee, I am asking for your help.  Please Vote to "RETAIN" all three justices on August 7, 2014.  

Further, donations may be sent to the following, to wit:

Committee to Retain Justice Clark
918 Fair St.
Franklin, TN 37064
www.keepconnieclark.com

Committee to Retain Sharon Lee
P.O. Box 584
Knoxville, TN 37901
www.justicesharonlee.com

Friends of Gary Wade
P.O. Box 32676
Knoxville, TN 37930
www.friendsofgarywade.com

Wednesday, April 30, 2014

New Medical Malpractice Opinion on Presuit Notice to the State of Tennessee

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Brown v. Samples, No. E2013-00799-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2014).  The summary states as follows:
This is a medical malpractice action brought against the State of Tennessee and others. The issue as to the appealing State is whether the plaintiffs complied with the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (2012 & Supp. 2013). The State argues that the plaintiffs were required to send the pre-suit notice applicable to their claim against the State to either (1) the Attorney General of Tennessee or an Assistant Attorney General, or (2) the Division of Claims Administration of the State. The Tennessee Claims Commission denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding (1) no statutory authority requiring that pre-suit notice as to the State be served upon one of the parties alluded to by the State, and (2) that the State received adequate pre-suit notice in this case. We affirm and hold that the plaintiffs complied with Section 121’s pre-suit notice requirements by providing notice to the University of Tennessee Graduate School of Medicine, a health care provider, which entity is a division of an agency of the State of Tennessee and also a named defendant in this case. 
Here is a link to the opinion:

NOTE: Please note that this case was filed before the statutory name change (from medical malpractice actions to health care liability actions), which is noted in footnote 1 of this opinion.

Thursday, April 24, 2014

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on Substantial Compliance as It Relates to the Filing of Affidavits Demonstrating Presuit Notice in a Health Care Liability Action

The Tennessee Supreme Court just released its opinion in Thurmond v. Mid-Cumberland Infectious Disease Consultants, PLLC, No. M2012-02270-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Sixty days prior to filing his complaint, the plaintiff in this health care liability action sent written notice of his potential claim to each of the health care providers that would be named as defendants. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2013). The plaintiff served the pre-suit notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, as permitted by statute.  Id. § 29-26-121(a)(3)(B). In his subsequent complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he had complied with the statutory requirement of pre-suit notice, id. § 29-26-121(b), but the plaintiff failed to file with the complaint “an affidavit of the party mailing the [pre-suit] notice establishing that the specified notice was timely mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested,” id. § 29-26-121(a)(4). The defendants moved for dismissal of the lawsuit, citing the plaintiff’s failure to file with the complaint an affidavit of the person who had sent the pre-suit notice by certified mail. The defendants did not allege that the lack of the affidavit resulted in prejudice. Instead, the defendants contended that the pre-suit notice statute demands strict compliance with all its requirements and that dismissal is the mandatory remedy for noncompliance. The trial court “reluctantly” agreed with the defendants and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed but noted the “harsh results” strict compliance produces in cases, such as this one, where no prejudice is alleged. We granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the statutory requirement of an affidavit of the person who sent pre-suit notice by certified mail may be satisfied by substantial compliance. We also hold that the plaintiff substantially complied with the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint is reversed; the complaint is reinstated; and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Here is a link to the opinion:



Trial Court Ruling Allowing Plaintiff to File an Amended Certificate of Good Faith and Denying Defense Motion to Dismiss Upheld on Appeal

The Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Stovall v. UHS of Lakeside, LLC, No. W2013-01504-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2014).  The summary of the opinion states as follows:
Appellant medical providers appeal the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss a medical malpractice complaint for failure to strictly comply with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-122(d)(4). Because we conclude that the trial court had good cause to grant an extension, within which to file a certificate of good faith, we affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Here's a link to the opinion:



Thursday, April 10, 2014

Health Care Liability Action: Court Reiterates That Statute of Repose Bars a Minor's Claim After Three Years; No Tolling Due to Minority in Such Cases

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just released its opinion in Bentley v. Wellmont Health Sys., No. E2013-01956-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Here's a link to the opinion:

Video: Deposing Experts with Daubert in Mind

Here is a video from the ABA that I found informative on deposing expert witnesses.  It is available at the link below:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zk_jRK4tocg

Monday, March 31, 2014

New Medical Malpractice Opinion: Court Holds That Case Was Not Subject to Dismissal Due to an Omitted Affidavit at Filing

The Tennessee Court of appeals just issued its opinion in Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Bradley Cnty., No. E2013-01064-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014).   
In this medical malpractice[] case, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file, with his complaint, the affidavit of the person who mailed pre-suit notice to the defendants. The trial court, noting that plaintiff complied with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (Supp. 2013) in every respect except for filing the affidavit, and that he filed the affidavit shortly after the complaint, denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had substantially complied with the statute. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Here's a link to the opinion, to wit:


NOTE: Medical malpractice actions are now known as "health care liability actions" for cases that accrued on or after April 23, 2012.  This case, however, accrued before that date, which is why it is referred to by the old name as explained by footnote 1 of the opinion.

New Medical Malpractice Opinion: Court of Appeals Holds That Case Refiled under the Saving Statute Was Not Subject to Dismissal Because Plaintiffs Did Not Resend Presuit Notices Before Refiling the Case

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Potter v. Perrigan, No. E2013-01442-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a medical malpractice[] action. Plaintiffs timely filed a complaint after properly sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the initial complaint, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint pursuant to the saving statute with an attached certificate of good faith and a copy of the original pre-suit notices. Defendants moved to dismiss the second complaint for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a). The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court. 
Here is a link to the opinion, to wit:


NOTE: Medical malpractice actions are now known as "health care liability actions" for cases that accrued on or after April 23, 2012.  This case, however, accrued before that date, which is why it is referred to by the old name as explained by footnote 1 of the opinion.

Thursday, March 13, 2014

Florida Supreme Court Declares Caps on Noneconomic Damages Unconstitutional

In an opinion released today (see link below), the Florida Supreme Court declared caps on noneconomic damages to be unconstitutional in wrongful death, medical malpractice cases on equal protection grounds under the Florida Constitution.  The case is Estate of McCall v. United States, No. SC11-1148 (Fla. Mar. 13, 2014).  It was a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2014/sc11-1148.pdf

Friday, March 07, 2014

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119

The Tennessee Supreme Court issued its opinion today in Becker v. Ford Motor Co., No. M2013-02546-SC-R23-CV (Tenn. Mar. 7, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (2009) certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Based on the undisputed facts, the District Court has asked this Court to determine whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant, even though the statute of limitations on that claim has expired. We hold that the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed.  Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer or amended answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor.
Here's a link to the opinion:

https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/beckermichaelopnorder.pdf

This opinion is no real surprise as far as Tennessee's law of comparative fault is concerned.  It is a more current version of another reported decision on this issue.  See generally Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., 50 S.W.3d 446 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).  However, as the Tennessee Supreme Court pointed out, this certified question was taken to clarify Tennessee's substantive law of comparative fault for the federal courts (which have, respectfully, misinterpreted Tennessee's law of comparative fault for a long time now).

Thursday, February 27, 2014

Plaintiffs Capped by the Ad Damnum in The Complaint

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Wilson v. Americare Systems, Inc., No. M2013-00690-COA-RM-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2014).  The summary in the slip opinion states as follows:
A defendant appeals the award of punitive damages arising from the death of a patient at an assisted living facility, which the defendant managed. We affirm the trial court’s review of the Hodges factors and the due process analysis relating to the punitive damage award. We also affirm the trial court’s directed verdict making the defendant liable for the actions of the assisted living facility’s employees. We must modify the amount of the punitive damage award by reducing it to comply with the amount the plaintiff requested in the ad damnum clause of their complaint.
Here is a link to the opinion:


This opinion is a harsh reminder that a plaintiff is limited by the ad damnum in the complaint in a Tennessee state court civil action, which is contrary to the rule in federal court.

New Opinion on Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119; the Governmental Tort Liability Act; and the Claims Commission

The Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Moreno v. City of Clarksville, No. M2013-01465-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion reads as follows:
Plaintiff filed a timely claim with the Division of Claims Administration, which did not resolve the claim within the statutory period. The claim was transferred to the Claims Commission, and Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to the Claims Commission Rules. Much later, the State amended its answer to allege fault by the City of Clarksville. Plaintiff filed suit against the City. The suit was dismissed because the trial court found that the “original complaint” under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was not filed within a year of the alleged
injury. Plaintiff appealed. We reverse.
Here is a link to the opinion:


This opinion offers a very good discussion of Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 20-1-119; the Governmental Tort Liability Act; and the Claims Commission.  It is a must-read for any Tennessee trial lawyer.

Court of Appeals Upholds Trial Court's Dismissal of Plaintiff's Medical Malpractice Case Due to a Failure to Comply with Relatively New Tort Reform Statute That Required Sixty-day Presuit Notice

The Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Blankenship v. Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C., No. E2013-01674-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
Kristine Blankenship (“Plaintiff”) sued Anesthesiology Consultants Exchange, P.C. (“Defendant”) alleging, in part, that as a result of Defendant’s failure to properly treat a surgical patient Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a severe and disabling injury to her back.” Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment after finding that Plaintiff had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 by filing her complaint less than 60 days after sending the notice letter. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether Defendant waived the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 conflicts with Rule 18.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to this case. We hold, as did the Trial Court, that Defendant did not waive the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based upon Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and that Plaintiff waived her second issue by not raising it in the Trial Court. We affirm.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/blankenshipkopn.pdf

Needless to say, this is an unusual case that is muddled by the fact that it seems to sound in both medical negligence and ordinary negligence.  For the reader of this post, please be mindful of the timing of recent tort reform legislation as it applies to this case.

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

Health Care Liability Reports for the State of Tennessee from 2005-13

The State of Tennessee's Department of Commerce & Insurance publishes reports on health care liability actions (f.k.a. medical malpractice actions).  These reports have been published since 2005.  They are below:


These reports offer a lot of information on "med mal" claims in Tennessee.  Most importantly, the reports show that the number of med mal claims being filed each year are trending down; the amount of money paid to claimants is trending down; etc.  

Thursday, February 13, 2014

New Health Care Liability Action Regarding an Unavailable Expert Witness: New Trial Ordered

The Court of Appeals released its opinion in Cullum v. Baptist Hosp. Sys., Inc., No. M2012-02640-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2014).  Here is the summary from the slip opinion:
The trial court prohibited the use of taped testimony from a prior trial when a doctor exercised his statutory right not to appear at trial, ordering that the doctor “needs to testify live or not at all.” Efforts of the defendants’ counsel to secure the doctor’s live testimony were successful, only to have the plaintiffs’ counsel argue that counsel was being ambushed.  The trial court finally determined not to allow the doctor to testify. The issues relating to prohibiting the doctor’s taped testimony and then prohibiting the doctor’s live testimony were appealed, along with other issues that arose during the trial. We find these two testimonial issues dispositive. We reverse the trial court on both issues and remand for a new trial.
Here's a link to the opinion:


This will be the fourth trial of this case upon remand.

Thursday, February 06, 2014

3T Design Recalls Cervelo Bicycles with Aduro Aero Handlebars Due to Risk of Injury

See link below:

http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/3t-design-recalls-cervelo-bicycles-with-aduro-aero-handlebars-due-to-risk-of-injury-243542191.html

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Saving Statute Extended in "Transitional Case" by Presuit Notice Being Given

Upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Tennessee Court of Appeals just issued its opinion in Johnson v. Floyd, No. W2012-00207-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This case is before us upon mandate from the Tennessee Supreme Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion, Johnson v. Floyd, No. W2012-00207-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2500900 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012), in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Rajvongs v. Wright, --- S.W.3d ----, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. 2013). Based on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.
Here's a link to the slip opinion:

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/johnsonderopn.pdf

NOTE: In a nutshell, this opinion allowed a one-hundred-twenty-day extension to the saving statute because this case is a "transitional case."  This post, however, should be read in conjunction with my June 30, 2012 post to gain a better understanding of the issues at hand.

Saturday, February 01, 2014

DepositionOnline.com

I came across this service the other day.  I have no idea if it works well or not (haven't used it) but it looks pretty interesting.  Please see link below:

http://depositiononline.com/

Thursday, January 30, 2014

Tennessee Court of Appeals Holds That Plaintiff's Failure to Effect Proper Presuit Notice Prevents Initial Action from Being Timely Filed, Which Prevents Case from Being Refiled under the Saving Statute

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion in Byrge v. Parkwest Med. Ctr., No. E2013-00927-COA-R3-CV (Jan. 30, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
After taking a non-suit, Bobby J. Byrge, individually and as next of kin for the decedent Julia Kay Byrge, and the Estate of Julia Kay Byrge (“Plaintiff”) filed a second healthcare liability suit against Parkwest Medical Center (“Parkwest”) and Dr. John C. Showalter, M.D.[] Parkwest filed a motion to dismiss, and after a hearing, the Trial Court granted Parkwest’s motion finding and holding that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations.  Plaintiff appeals to this Court asserting that his suit was not barred as he was entitled to rely upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105, the saving statute. We affirm finding and holding, as did the Trial Court, that Plaintiff’s first suit was not timely filed because Plaintiff did not comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121, and, therefore, Plaintiff could not rely upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-1-105 to save his second suit.
Here's a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/byrgebjopn.pdf

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion: Health Care Liability Action Allowed to Proceed

The Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion today in Cannon ex rel. Good v. Reddy, No. M2012-01332-SC-S10-CV (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion reads as follows:
The plaintiff filed a health care liability action against the defendant. During the pendency of her action, the General Assembly enacted the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her original action. The plaintiff then filed two successive actions.  First, the plaintiff filed a second action that did not comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith statutes. The plaintiff then filed a third action that complied with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and -122. The plaintiff moved to consolidate her second and third actions, and the defendant moved to dismiss. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s second action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements and that her third action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court consolidated the lawsuits and denied the defendant’s motions to dismiss. The defendant moved for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court denied. We granted the defendant’s  application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second action. As a result of the plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal and our recent holding in Rajvongs v. Wright, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2013 WL 6504425 (Tenn. Dec. 12, 2013), we hold that the plaintiff, who properly provided pre-suit notice of her claim prior to filing her third action, was entitled to a 120-day extension in which to refile her complaint pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The plaintiff’s third complaint was therefore timely filed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.
Here's a link to that opinion: http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/cannonopn.pdf

Monday, January 20, 2014

Remembering Why We Stand Up for What Is Right

Today I attended a luncheon at the Gordon Jewish Community Center ("GJCC") here in Nashville (here is the GJCC's Web site: www.nashvillejcc.org).  (As an aside, the GJCC is a wonderful place.)

John Seigenthaler spoke about civil rights since the death of President John F. Kennedy, and, or course, about Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in particular.  It was a very moving speech; one that reminded me why we must stand up for what is right.  What I took away from the speech, in part, is this: discrimination---in any form (especially coupled with ignorance)---is evil.  It has led to slavery, to the Holocaust, etc.  But I also took this way from his speech: things can change; and with a little help from regular people---folks like you and me---we can make a difference.  Now, it might not be easy; in fact, it might be really difficult at times. But if we stand up for the right thing, the world we live in (and the world we leave to our children) will be a much better place.  

I want to leave you all with this thought.  My son, who is three, loves a Dr. Seuss movie called The Lorax. There is a quote from the movie that states as follows: “Unless someone like you cares a whole awful lot, nothing is going to get better. It's not.” 

I'm extremely glad we had people like JFK and MLK who cared; and that we have people like Mr. Seigenthaler who cared---and still cares.  It does my heart good.