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Tuesday, March 31, 2015

Tony Duncan Receives Highest Rating Possible from Martindale-Hubbell: AV Preeminent

I am honored and humbled to have recently received the highest rating possible from Martindale-Hubbell, which is an AV Preeminent rating.  Here is a link to my rating page: 


Again, I am honored and humbled.  This is a milestone that I will always cherish.

New Health Care Liability Opinion: Plaintiffs' Failure to File Certificate of Good Faith Leads to a Dismissal of Their Case with Prejudice

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Dennis v. Smith, No. E2014-00636-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2015).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Linda Dennis and Creed Dennis [] filed a healthcare liability action against Dr. Robert G. Smith [] and others. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Circuit Court for Knox County [] dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims after finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs had failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-121 and 29-26-122. Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their claims to this Court. We find and hold that because Plaintiffs failed to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122, their action was subject to dismissal with prejudice upon motion. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Here is a link to the opinion:


New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: A Spouse's Loss-of-consortium Claim and Presuit Notice

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently issued its opinion in Igou v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2013-02837-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2015).  This opinion has to do with a spouse's derivative loss-of-consortium claim in conjunction with a health care liability action.  The summary from the opinion states as follows: 
This appeal asks whether a wife‘s loss of consortium claim, brought pursuant to her husband‘s underlying health care liability action, is itself a health care liability action subject to the pre-suit notice provision of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act. The trial court granted the hospital‘s motion to dismiss, finding that the wife‘s claim was a health care liability action under the Act and that she had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice provision. As an alternative ground for dismissal, the court also found that the wife had failed to file suit within the statute of limitation. We vacate the trial court‘s order of dismissal with prejudice and remand.
Here is a link to the opinion:

Tuesday, March 10, 2015

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Foreign Object Case Is a Health Care Liability Action; Not a Case That Can Be Classified as One of Ordinary Negligence as Plaintiff Contends

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Smith v. Testerman, No. E2014-00956-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2015).  The opinion has to do with a foreign object, a surgical sponge, left in a wound to help treat a post-surgical infection; it does not deal with a sponge left in during surgery, which is significant in my opinion as to whether a certificate of good faith is required under Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-122.

The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a case alleging negligence by the defendants which resulted in injury to a patient, Dennis Smith. Following hernia surgery, Mr. Smith was fitted for a wound vacuum because an infection had developed at the surgical site. A sponge was placed to absorb the infection.  The defendants removed the wound vacuum when the infection dissipated, but they failed to remove the sponge, which later caused the wound to burst. Mr. Smith filed suit, and the defendants asserted that dismissal was appropriate because Mr. Smith had not complied with the filing requirements of the health care liability statute. Mr. Smith 1 responded that his complaint sounded in ordinary negligence, not health care liability. The trial court agreed and denied the motions but also granted permission for the defendants to pursue an interlocutory appeal. We granted the application for permission to appeal and now reverse the decision of the trial court.
Here is a link to the opinion:

Monday, March 02, 2015

Another Health Care Liability Action Opinion: What Limits May a Trial Court Place upon a Defendant's Ex Parte Contact with a Plaintiff's Treating Physicians under Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(f)?

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion recently in S.W. ex rel. Warren v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp., No. W2014-00621-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2015).  It is a companion case to the Dean-Hayslett case that is the subject of my Jan. 20, 2015, which can be viewed a few posts below.

The summary from the majority opinion states as follows:
This is a healthcare liability action. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(f)(1), but set-forth several conditions, including: 1) a court reporter must be present at the ex parte interviews with Plaintiff’s treating healthcare providers and record all questions and answers; 2) all answers during the interviews must be under oath; 3) the interview transcripts shall be filed under seal and with permission of the trial court, and after showing of good cause, Plaintiff may access the transcripts for the purpose of determining whether a violation of privacy under HIPAA occurred during the interviews; and 4) Defendants should not attempt to elicit or discuss protected health information which is not relevant to the issues in this lawsuit. The order also provided “[t]his does not restrict the Defendants or their attorneys from discussing non-substantive matters unrelated to the patient’s protected health information.” The trial court denied Defendants’ joint motion for interlocutory appeal of the order and Defendants filed an application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the appeal for the sole purpose of determining whether, under section 29-26-121(f), the trial court erred by adding the four conditions noted above to its order. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Here is a link to that opinion:


This decision is atypical in that there are two concurring opinions: one by Judge Stafford and the other by Judge Dinkins, to wit:


Wednesday, February 25, 2015

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Saving Statute Held to Be Extended by 120 Days Due to Presuit Notice Letters Being Sent Out under Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121

The Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion today in Tinnel v. East Tennessee Ear, Nose, and Throat Specialists, P.C., No. E2014-00906-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2015).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff filed a complaint after 2 sending pre-suit notices to Defendants. After voluntarily dismissing the complaint, Plaintiff filed a second set of pre-suit notices before re-filing the complaint. The pre-suit notices were filed within one year of the voluntary dismissal. Defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the re-filed complaint was untimely because it was not filed within one year of the dismissal pursuant to the saving statute. Plaintiff responded that the re-filed complaint was timely because the pre-suit notices entitled her to a 120-day extension of the saving statute pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c). The trial court dismissed the action.  Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court.  
Here's a link to the opinion:

Monday, February 23, 2015

Tennessee Supreme Court Denies Appeal in Harper v. Jackson-Madison Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Dist.

Last Thursday (Feb. 19, 2015) the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the defendant's application for permission to appeal under Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in Harper v. Bradley Cnty.  This is a significant denial of an appeal because it allows the previous ruling to stand in that a plaintiff now gets the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations against a governmental entity (when proper presuit notices have been effected, of course) under the 2011 amendment in question.

Here is a link to the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Court's Web site where a copy of the order denying permission to appeal can be obtained, to wit:


Further, please note that this post is a follow-up post to ones I made on this blog on January 31, 2015:


November 3, 2014: 

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2014/11/new-health-care-liability-opinion-120.html.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case may very well become a reported decision under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4.  If it does, Harper will become controlling authority for all purposes under said rule.

Saturday, January 31, 2015

Another Health Care Liability Action Opinion Holding 120-day Extension to Statute of Limitations Applies to Governmental Entities

The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in Wade v. Jackson-Madison Cnty. Gen. Hosp. Dist., No. W2014-01103-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015).  This opinion held that a plaintiff gets the benefit of the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations (provider proper presuit notice letters are delivered, of course) when the defendant is a governmental entity.  

The summary of the opinion states as follows:
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant medical providers on the basis that the plaintiffs’ health care liability complaint was filed after the expiration of the Governmental Tort Liability Act statute of limitations. Because we conclude that, under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(c), plaintiffs were entitled to a 120-day extension on the applicable statute of limitations, we reverse and remand.
Here is a link to the opinion:


NOTE: This post should be read in conjunction with my Nov. 03, 2014 post, which is at the following link:

http://theduncanlawfirm.blogspot.com/2014/11/new-health-care-liability-opinion-120.html

Further, all three sections of the Tennessee Court of Appeals have held that the 120-day extension applies to governmental entities if proper presuit notice is sent out.  Wade, supra, is from the Western Section.  Harper, which is the subject of my Nov. 3 post, is from the Eastern Section.  (A Tenn. R. App. P. 11 was filed in late Dec. 2014.) And the Middle Section has held similarly in Banks v. Bordeaux Long Term Care, Nos. M2013-01775-COA-R3-CV & M2014-00119-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2014), app. for perm. app. filed, (No. M2013-01775-SC-R11-CV, Dec. 26, 2014).

As you can discern, if the Tennessee Supreme Court accepts the application in either Harper or Banks, these decisions may be reversed.  However, if an application is denied in either case and the case ends up being reported, it will be controlling authority for all purposes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 4(G).  Stay tuned.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

New Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion on Presuit Notice in Health Care Liability Actions: Presuit Notice Must Be Sent Prior to Case Being Refiled under the Saving Statute; Case Dismissed Without Prejudice

The Tennessee Supreme Court issued its opinion today in Foster v. Chiles, No. E2012-01780-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Jan. 27, 2015).  The court held that presuit notices must be sent prior to a case being refiled under the saving statute and dismissed the case without prejudice. Justice Wade dissented.  

Here is the summary from the majority opinion:
This appeal presents two issues for review: 1) whether a person asserting a health care liability claim must give written notice of the claim to all potential health care defendants before re-filing a complaint, or whether notice given before filing the first complaint is sufficient notice for a subsequently filed complaint against the same defendants; and 2) if pre-suit notice is required for each complaint, whether the sanction for noncompliance is a dismissal with or without prejudice. The plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave the defendants written notice under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1). Thereafter, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint. The plaintiffs re-filed their complaint but did not provide the defendants with notice before the re-filing. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiffs had to give pre-suit notice only once and that pre-suit notice for the first complaint was sufficient for any subsequently filed complaints asserting the same claims against the same defendants. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint. The sanction for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(1) is a dismissal without prejudice.
Here is a link to the majority opinion and Justice Wade's dissent, respectively:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/fostersamuel.opn_2.pdf

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/fostersamueldis.opn_.pdf

The opinion from the Tennessee Court of Appeals can be found at my October 12, 2013 post on this blog.

Tuesday, January 20, 2015

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: What Limits May a Trial Court Place upon a Defendant's Ex Parte Contact with a Plaintiff's Treating Physicians under Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(f)? Limits by Trial in This Case Disallowed.

Today the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Dean-Hayslett v. Methodist Healthcare, No. W2014-00625-COA-R10-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2015).  This opinion deals with qualified protective orders allowing ex parte contact with a Plaintiff's treating physicians under Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-121(f). 

The majority opinion summary states as follows:
This is a healthcare liability action. The trial court granted Defendants’ joint motion for a qualified protective order pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26-121(f)(1), but added several conditions not specifically provided in the statute. The trial court denied Defendants’ joint motion for permission to seek an interlocutory appeal, and we granted Defendants’ motion for an extraordinary appeal to this Court under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.  We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Here are links to the majority opinion and Judge Stafford's concurring-in-results-only opinion:


http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/hayslettcon.pdf

NOTE: It is important to keep on mind that this is an interlocutory appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure where the the focus is upon what restrictions a trial court can place upon a qualified protective order under -121(f); that is it.  Per this opinion, a trial court may not require that the interviewed providers respond under oath; that a court reporter be present; or that the recorded interviews be filed under seal.

Further, Judge Stafford's concurring opinion foreshadows an effective constitutional challenge to -121(f).  While it doesn't mention it per se, I think it lends a lot of credibility to a separation-of-powers challenge.

Lastly, this opinion is the first Tennessee state-court appellate opinion that I am aware of that directly addresses -121(f).

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Must an Expert Nurse Be Compensated During Prior Employment as a Nurse to Render an Opinion

On January 13, 2014, the Tennessee Court of Appeals rendered its opinion in Adkins v. Associates of the Mem'l/ Mission Outpatient Surgery Ctr., LLC, No. E2014-00790-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2014).  The opinion dealt with whether a nurse had to be compensated for her prior work as a nurse to be qualified to render expert opinion testimony in a health care liability action.

The summary of the opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action in which Defendant sought summary[] judgment, claiming that Plaintiffs’ expert was not qualified to render an expert opinion because she was not practicing in her field during the year preceding the date of the injury. The trial court agreed and dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.
(Footnote omitted.)

Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/adkinsopn.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Effect of a Plaintiff's Waiver of a Defendant Having to File a Certificate of Good Faith When That Defendant Alleges Fault Against a Nonparty That Is Sued Based upon Defendant's Allegation of Fault

On December 30, 2014, the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Sirbaugh v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2014-00153-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014).  This opinion has to do with the effect of a waiver by the plaintiff of the defendant having to file a certificate of good faith when the defendant alleges fault against a nonparty health care provider.  

The summary from the opinion states as follows:
The plaintiff in this interlocutory appeal filed a complaint asserting health care liability claims against the original defendants, at which time she included a certificate of good faith in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122. The original defendants asserted comparative fault against non-party health care providers. The plaintiff waived compliance by the original defendants with section 29-26-122(b), which required the defendants to file a certificate of good faith regarding the non-party health care providers.  The plaintiff thereafter amended her complaint to add the named non-party health care providers as new defendants but did not file a new certificate of good faith. The new defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The trial court denied the motions and granted this interlocutory appeal. We reverse.
Here's a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/sirbaughs.opn_.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: Expert Need Not Phrase Opinion in Perfect Legalese to Create Question of Fact for the Jury to Decide

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion in Dickson v. Kriger, No. W2013-02830-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2014) in late December 2014.  This is an important opinion in that it holds that an expert need not use perfect legalese or "magic words" to be qualified to give opinions on the standard of care and causation in a health care liability action, which creates questions of fact for the jury to decide.  As such, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed a directed verdict in favor of the defense.

The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Patient brought a health care liability action against his eye surgeon, alleging that the surgeon’s negligence in performing a LASIK procedure resulted in several eye injuries. The trial court granted a directed verdict for the surgeon, finding the patient failed to present evidence establishing the standard of care and causation. Because we find the evidence was sufficient to create an issue for the jury, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/dicksonleonopn_0.pdf

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: HIPAA Authorizations & Presuit Notice of Claim

The Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion on December 15, 2014, in Hamilton v. Abercrombie Radiological Consultants, Inc., No. E2014-00433-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action, arising from the death of Decedent, David Hamilton. Decedent’s surviving spouse, Donna Hamilton (Appellant), filed this action against Appellees, Abercrombie Radiological Consultants, Inc. and Dr. Donna K. Culhane.  Appellees moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121 et seq. Specifically, the Appellees challenged whether the medical release provided with the pre-suit notice letter was compliant with the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). The trial court agreed with Appellees and dismissed the action with prejudice. Appellant timely appealed. We reverse and remand the matter to the trial court.
Here is a link to the opinion:

http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/hamilton_david_.pdf

Thursday, January 15, 2015

I've Been Away for Some Time But I Am Back Now

To my readers:

Sorry I haven't posted in a while.  Some things arose at the end of 2014 that could not be avoided and I had to tend to them.  I'm wrapping matters up now and will start posting again today.

Thanks for reading.

Tony

Tuesday, November 04, 2014

Offer of Judgment Made under Tenn. R. Civ . P. 68 Held to Be Irrevocable During Ten-day Period

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion Friday in McGinnis ex rel. McGinnis v. Cox, No. M2014-00102-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2014).  The summary from the opinion states as follows:
Plaintiffs presented Defendants with an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to Defendants’ acceptance, Plaintiffs attempted to rescind the offer. Defendants nevertheless accepted the offer within the time allowed by Rule 68 and attempted to enforce the offer of judgment. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were not entitled to revoke the offer of judgment and entered an order granting the motion to enforce the judgment. We affirm and remand.
Here is a link to the slip opinion:


NOTE: the ten-day life of an offer of judgment can be extended via Rule 6 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.  This is all the more reason that one must be very careful before making an offer of judgment under Rule 68.

Monday, November 03, 2014

New Health Care Liability Action Opinion: 120-day Extension to Statute of Limitations Applies to Governmental Entities

The Eastern Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion last week in Harper v. Bradley Cnty., No. E2014-00107-COA-R9-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
The issue presented on this appeal is whether a plaintiff who brings a health care liability action against a governmental entity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”) is entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(c)(Supp. 2014) under the current version of the Health Care Liability Act (“the HCLA”). This inquiry focuses on the effect of the 2011 amendment to the HCLA that expressly includes “claims against the state or a political subdivision thereof” within the definition of “health care liability action.” Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), we hold that the 2011 amendment demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the General Assembly to allow the GTLA’s one-year statute of limitations to be extended by 120 days in cases where a plaintiff satisfies the requirements of the HCLA. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying defendant Bradley County’s motion to dismiss.
(Emphasis and italics in original.)

Here is a link to the opinion:


NOTE: This post should be read with my May 9, 2013 post discussing the Cunningham case cited in the summary above (with its footnotes foreshadowing this decision).  Here is a link to that post: 


Further, this is a must-read opinion for any lawyer who handles health care liability cases (f.k.a. medical malpractice cases).  If this case is taken up by the Tennessee Supreme Court, which is very likely, the Court will more than likely affirm the trial court as the lower appellate court did.  It is the correct decision in my humble opinion.

Lastly, it would be a safe assumption for one to think that the three-year statute of repose would be extended by 120 days via the 2011 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. sec. 29-26-101, too. Compare Harper, supra, with T.C.A. § 29-26-121(c).  However, I am not aware of any case holding that way at this time.

Tuesday, August 12, 2014

Health Care Liability Action Dismissed via Summary Judgment

The Tennessee Court of Appeals released its opinion today in Buman v. Gibson, No. W2013-01867-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2014).  The summary from the slip opinion states as follows:
This is a health care liability action involving a physician’s duties when supervising a physician’s assistant. The plaintiff alleged the supervising physician negligently supervised a physician’s assistant which resulted in the eventual amputation of the plaintiff’s leg. The physician moved for summary judgment, contending that he complied with all statutory duties. The plaintiff responded to this motion and simultaneously moved to amend her complaint to allege that the physician was vicariously liable for the negligent actions of the physician’s assistant. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint and granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Here's a link to the opinion:

https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/bumanm_081114.pdf